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ABSTRACT
Online social networks have become ubiquitous and changed the way that
users interact online. There has been an enormous growth in the usage of
online social networking in the past few years as users share a variety of
information including personal profiles, pictures, and messages to socialize
with their friends in the Internet. Besides, several special purpose social
networks have emerged to serve their users with useful functionalities. This
vast amount of user data is valuable, and therefore, introduce several security
and privacy risks and challenges.
In this thesis we propose several techniques to enhance the security and
privacy features of online social networks. Our goal is to shift the control over
user data from a centralized social network provider to the end users. We
realize this concept by decentralization of the social networking architecture.
First, we construct and implement a cryptographic access control mecha-
nism that ensures data confidentiality and integrity, and efficiently supports
the fine-grained access policies expected by social network users. Next, we
present a detailed design of a decentralized online social network that fo-
cuses on security and privacy. Finally, we propose and implement auditable
anonymity, a cryptographic scheme, which allows a social networking user
to keep track of who accesses her data even when her data is encrypted and
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, Online Social Networks (OSNs) such as Facebook,
Google+, Twitter, etc. have become ubiquitous and have changed the way
users interact on the Internet. They provide a platform where users con-
nect and share personal information with their social contacts, also known as
friends. In addition to socialization, OSNs such as PatientsLikeMe, LinkedIn,
Academia.edu serve their users with useful functionalities, for example, sug-
gestions on a medical condition, jobs, and connection with research commu-
nities. A significant growth has occurred in the usage of OSNs in recent
years. Started in 2004, Facebook in 2013 has over a billion active users [1];
Google+ has 359 million active users [2]; there are more than 500 million
users on Twitter [3], and more than 225 million users on LinkedIn [4].
Along with services, either socialization or other functionalities, OSNs in-
troduce new challenges and risks. Study shows that Facebook users share
more than 30 billion pieces of data each month, whereas Twitter users send
over 400 million tweets each day [1, 5]. This large amount of data is valu-
able [6], and introduces security and privacy risks, and turns the provider
into an attractive attack target. While information such as a status post
on Facebook may not be considered sensitive, social networks contain other
information that are considered sensitive, and if revealed to inappropriate
parties, can cause harm to the users. For example, recently, users have
started using the location services to share their geographic information on
the OSN. An ambiguous privacy setting may reveal this information to un-
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wanted parties. Besides, a collection or this kind of information can be used
to infer user’s location [7, 8].
If not protected properly, social networking data can be used to infer sensi-
tive information. For example, study has shown that social networking data
has been used to derive social security number [9, 10]. OSNs may not store
social security numbers directly, but they store enough data that can be used
to derive such information. Users store their date of birth and email address
that associate the users to their schools or specific communities. Hence, if
revealed to inappropriate parties, this information may be used against the
user to perform identity theft and other harmful activities.
Experimental and real phishing attacks have been performed on Face-
book [11, 12]. Insiders can also intentionally or accidentally release private
information [10, 13]. Several privacy compromises by the OSN provider ei-
ther intentionally or accidentally also have thrown these issues into sharp
focus [14, 15]. In addition to the OSN provider and the users in the OSN,
third party applications introduce new security and privacy risks by reveal-
ing personal user information such as list of users’ social contacts and profile
information [16,17] .
The primary reason of these issues is the complete control of a central-
ized social network provider, for example Facebook or Google+, on a large
collection of user data. Users trust the provider with their data. However,
the provider can use the user data any way it wants. Therefore, researchers
have proposed several designs to shift the access enforcement point from
the OSN provider to the end users. Unfortunately, not all these proposed
schemes provide adequate level of privacy. Several designs [18–21] focus on
cryptography-based access control while keeping the centralized architecture
of the OSN provider. Centralized OSN providers are interested in user data
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since they can sell it with advertisers who can send targeted advertisements
based on this data.
On the other hand, users interested in using the OSN functionalities must
trust the provider hoping that it will not misuse their data. However, con-
cerned users share limited information or in some cases restrict themselves
from participating in any OSN. Hence, a decentralized architecture is more
desirable for enhancing security and privacy in OSNs. Researchers have
worked on designs [22–26] that primarily focus on decentralization of the
OSN rather than security and privacy. A recent work [27] combines both
cryptography and distributed storage service, but falls short supporting ac-
cess revocation, which is a required feature to support the type of policy
expected by social network users. None of these proposed works allow users
to get an idea about who accesses their data while providing adequate level
of security and privacy.
Apart from socialization, social networking is being used to support pa-
tients who have similar symptoms and want to get real world experience 1.
It provides a platform where patients share different types of medical infor-
mation, and this information is shared with third parties [28]. Medical data
is always considered sensitive, and hence, this kind of OSN should be secure
and private. In future, when this type of social networking will be popular
and widely used to support broader functionality, such as health information
exchange, patients will need more control on their data rather than trusting
the social network provider.
Decentralization will enable patient-centric medical social networking where
patients are in control of their data. They can share their data with whoever
they want to get service without revealing this information to the social net-
1http://www.patientslikeme.com
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work provider. A secure health information exchange system will be possible
so that users get better service from the healthcare providers. We envision
a social networking system with enhanced security and privacy features that
will be used not only for better socialization but also improved healthcare
system.
1.1 Thesis Statement
In this thesis we investigate, analyze, and propose techniques to enhance
security and privacy in OSN. We focus on decentralization of the social net-
working architecture and cryptographic techniques. We believe that provid-
ing security and privacy in OSNs is challenging. We also understand that it
may not be achievable completely by hiding every piece of information since
that may interfere with the services provided by the OSN. Our work can be
summarized through the following research statement.
Security and privacy of online social networks can be enhanced by
shifting the control over user data from the centralized provider to
the end users through a decentralized architecture and advanced
cryptographic mechanisms.
1.2 Challenges
Decentralization of the social networking architecture shifts the control over
data to the end user and hence enhances security and privacy. However,
designing a secure and private decentralized social network is challenging.
• Distributing data requires careful consideration. In order to provide
confidentiality and integrity, researchers have proposed to encrypt data.
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However, as research shows, existing cryptographic techniques are not
adequate to support the flexible policy expected by social network
users [27].
• Encryption only may not be enough to provide privacy. Appropriate
measures should be taken to avoid any kind of information leak, for
example, inferring social relationships.
• Since there is no single platform to store and serve user data, ensuring
data availability gets challenging.
• Social networking data is of different types and may have multiple
ownership – for example, a comment on a status post belongs to both
the status poster and the commenter. Therefore, designing a data
structure that supports the complex security and privacy expectation
on social networking data is challenging.
• Finally, deployment of a decentralized OSN is the most challenging task
since it has to provide better security and privacy than existing OSNs
while allowing efficient service. However, our focus in this thesis is on
enhancing the security and privacy aspects, and we leave wide scale
deployment as a future work.
1.3 Requirements and Properties
1.3.1 Security and Privacy Requirements
We can outline a number of security and privacy requirements of a decen-
tralized social network:
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Confidentiality: Preserving the confidentiality of user content is a key
requirement for a decentralized OSN. Content should be accessible to only
those who are explicitly authorized by the content owner. Furthermore, nodes
hosting such data may themselves not be authorized to read the data.
Integrity: We must also ensure the integrity of the data so that OSN
users can be certain that the content posted by their friends is authentic.
This property is important in a peer-to-peer network since storage nodes are
untrusted and may try to perform unauthorized updates to the stored data.
Availability: User content should remain available until it is explicitly
deleted by its owner, even if the owner is oﬄine, and despite potential mali-
cious attempts to destroy the data. Readers should also be able to retrieve
the most recent version of a content object rather than past ones.
Explicit Owner-specified Access Control: Policies controlling who
may view, modify, or comment on content are defined by its owner and
cannot be changed without the owner’s authorization. However, when a
content has multiple owners, the more restrictive policy should be enforced.
Relationship Privacy: User’s social graph is considered sensitive [29].
Relationships between users should remain hidden from third parties that
may have no relationship with the data owner and are therefore untrusted,
such as storage nodes.
Auditing: Users should be be able to get information about when and
by whom their data is used for better knowledge about privacy. Stealing or
sharing a digital data does not leave any trace. Informative auditing should
be enabled at every access of and action on information at each level, which
can be used in future to detect potential misuse of data.
Authentication: Information accessors should authenticate themselves
at each access of data. Identity of the accessors is a crucial part in tracing
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back misuse of data. However, authentication should not reveal any infor-
mation to inappropriate parties.
1.3.2 Threat Model
We assume that the participants in the decentralized OSN may be malicious
(or compromised) and therefore should not be trusted with the confidentiality
and integrity of data and relationship information. Moreover, the malicious
entities are considered to be Byzantine, and can launch both active and
passive attacks. Distributed systems are vulnerable to the problem of Sybil
attacks, where a single entity can obtain multiple identities in the system and
violate security properties. We assume the existence of mechanisms to defend
against the Sybil attack [30, 31]. We consider that up to 25% of the nodes
in the system can be malicious, since, beyond that, existing mechanisms [30]
are not able to securely route in distributed hash tables, which is a necessary
prerequisite to provide both integrity and availability guarantees.
In peer-to-peer networks, malicious nodes may attempt to launch denial of
service (DoS) attacks against honest peers, by overwhelming their network,
computational, or storage resources. We assume existence of defenses against
such DoS attacks [32, 33]. In this thesis we focus on architecture design and
cryptographic mechanisms to protect the security of stored data, rather than
on routing-based attacks or DoS attacks, which can be addressed by existing
mechanisms, and which we will therefore not discuss here.
1.4 Proposed Approaches
We propose three methods to enhance security and privacy in OSNs. These
methods should not be considered mutually exclusive, but combined together
7
they build up a secure and privacy-aware social network.
Our first approach named EASiER [34,35] is a cryptographic access control
scheme for social networking. Researchers have proposed Attribute-based
Encryption (ABE) to ensure data confidentiality in social networking because
of its expressiveness [27]. Unlike traditional cryptography, in ABE, data is
encrypted with a plaintext policy defined over a set of attributes, for example
‘(friend and family) or coworker’. Secret keys that satisfy this policy will
be able to decrypt this data. However, ABE schemes can be expensive to
provide perfect forward secrecy when the system requires frequent revocation
as they are burdened with redistributing individual secret keys. For example,
in social networking systems, users may encrypt data for their close friends,
but cease the relationship with a specific friend at a later time. In absence of
an efficient revocation scheme, they will have to re-key every remaining close
friend to protect data, which is an expensive task if the list is large. We
present an efficient revocation scheme in ABE by introducing a minimally
trusted proxy. Though we present it in the context of a social network, it can
be adopted by any system that uses ABE to protect its data.
We propose DECENT [36,37], a decentralized design and architecture for
OSN with an emphasis on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. We dis-
tribute user data and get rid of the centralized OSN provider. The underlying
storage system is a distributed hash table (DHT) that structurally stores and
retrieves private user data. We borrow the concept of object oriented design
to represent different types of social networking data such as user profiles,
wall posts, pictures, and messages. The data owner creates an object with the
data as an object element, and stores the object in the DHT. This operation
gives the user a reference to the object in the DHT. Since data is distributed,
each object along with its reference is encrypted to provide confidentiality.
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The objects and their references as well are encrypted using EASiER. This
architecture shifts the access control point from the provider to the users by
combining advanced cryptographic mechanisms and decentralization.
For sensitive data, for example, interactions in the social network, it is im-
portant to avoid revealing undue information to the storage provider. Despite
encryption, certain information, such as access patterns, are still available to
the storage provider and it can tell, for example, who accessed our data, or
who we interact with socially. Cryptographic access control makes it difficult
to implement important security protections, such as maintaining an audit
log of accesses. In the third approach, we allow a data owner to receive a
log of data accesses, while hiding this information from the storage provider.
We call this approach auditable anonymity. To address the auditability is-
sue, we extend anonymous credentials with revocable anonymity [38] that
allows users to prove in zero knowledge that they are authorized to access
a service or a piece of data without revealing the contents of the credential,
and, importantly, their identity through a chain of trust, a concept similar to
anonymous webs of trust [39]. Each access, however, generates an encrypted
record that can be used by a special anonymity revocation service to learn
who was behind such an access. In our architecture, this service is run by the
data owner, who is able to decrypt the audit log records and get an access
log.
1.5 Summary of Contribution
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
• We construct and implement a cryptographic scheme that supports
efficient revocation in attribute-based encryption. The code is available
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at https://bitbucket.org/hatswitch/easier.
• We construct and implement a cryptographic scheme that allows anony-
mous access on outsourced user data while creating a private access log
for the data owner hidden from the storage provider.
• We also design and implement a decentralized social networking archi-
tecture that focuses on data confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
We adopt and use the cryptographic schemes in the context of enhancing
security and privacy of online social networking. However, these approaches
are generalized and hence, any outsourced storage will be able to adopt these
techniques to provide security, privacy, and anonymity to protect their data.
1.6 Organization
In the rest of this thesis, we give a literature review in Chapter 2. We
describe the three approaches that we propose to enhance security and pri-
vacy in OSNs in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively, and briefly summarize in
Chapter 6 how these approaches are combined for a secure and privacy-aware
social network. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 7.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter we describe several existing works that try to address the
security and privacy issues of OSNs. At first we present a summary of the
existing works and why they fall short, and next we describe them in detail.
2.1 Summary
Researcher have been working on different approaches to address the secu-
rity and privacy problems of online social networking. These works broadly
can be categorized based on the architecture of the social network provider
(centralized or decentralized) and the type of mechanism used to provide se-
curity and privacy of stored data (cryptography, information flow, or trust).
Most of these works focus on one aspect rather than the overall design with
emphasis on security and privacy.
Some designs require users to trust the centralized provider with their data,
but focus on how information is shared with third party applications [40].
Some focus on auditing without emphasis on security and privacy [41]. Sev-
eral works use different types of cryptographic techniques as their protection
mechanism [18–20, 42–45]. In these approaches, the social network provider
may not have enough incentive to store encrypted data as it does not have
direct access to user data, or may infer a user’s social graph as it performs
key management or mediates access to users’ data.
Decentralization of the architecture allows more control over data to the
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users as it removes the concept of trusting a centralized provider [22–27,46].
In decentralized designs, data is stored with trusted or untrusted storage
nodes, which can be third party storage servers or other users in the social
network. In some designs users trust their social contacts to enforce their
privacy policies, some rely on a few supernodes for availability and access
control, and some trust the storage nodes with their data. A few designs use
cryptographic techniques for data protection.
However, several problems still exist. Existing designs do not take into con-
sideration the different types of data in OSNs, they do not consider complex
data ownership and flexible policies, and do not have option to track data ac-
cess while protecting data. Besides, when encryption is used to protect user
data, existing schemes fall short to cryptographically represent privacy poli-
cies expected by OSN users. We for the first time, present a comprehensive
design for a decentralized OSN, and construct novel cryptographic schemes
to support appropriate access control in social networking and anonymous
auditing on protected user data.
2.2 Centralized Social Networking Architecture
Singh et al. propose the xBook framework for building privacy preserving so-
cial network applications [40]. xBook uses information flow models to control
what untrusted applications can do with the information they receive. Their
design retains the functionality offered by existing online social networks.
xBook provides enforcement for both user-user access control for informa-
tion flow within a single application, as well as for information sharing with
entities outside xBook. Social network applications are re-designed to have
access to all the data that they require, but this data is not allowed to be
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passed on to an external entity unless approved by the user. However, xBook
does not perform encryption for data confidentiality and hence the security
and privacy risks persist.
Cristofaro et al. propose Hummingbird, a privacy enhanced version of
Twitter type social network [42]. In this architecture, users encrypt their
tweets and can follow hash-tags without revealing this information to unau-
thorized parties. Hummingbird is a centralized social networking design and
the provider does not have access to the tweet contents because of encryption,
which may not motivate it to store user data.
Lucas and Borisov propose flyByNight, a Facebook application designed
to mitigate privacy risks in social networks [19]. flyByNight users encrypt
sensitive messages using javascript on the client side and send the ciphertext
to some intended party, i.e., Facebook friends, who can then decrypt the
data. The architecture ensures that transferred sensitive data cannot be
viewed by the Facebook servers in an unencrypted form. However, the utility
of flyByNight is limited to preserving the privacy of messages intended for
social network friends, i.e., email type communication, and thus, it does not
provide complete privacy. For example, the application server knows a user’s
friendlist on facebook. flyByNight is also vulnerable to active attacks by the
OSN provider, since the OSN interface is used for key management.
Guha et al. propose to improve user privacy while still preserving the func-
tionality of existing online social network providers [18]. Their architecture
is called none of your business (NOYB), in which encryption is used to hide
the data from the untrusted social network provider. The key feature of their
architecture is a general cipher and encoding scheme that preserves the se-
mantic properties of data such that it can be processed by the social network
provider oblivious to encryption. A users private information is partitioned
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into atoms, and NOYB encrypts a users atom by substituting it with the
atom of another user. Thus the OSN can operate on ciphered data, but only
the authorized users can decrypt the result.
Frikken describes a key allocation scheme for OSNs [20]. In this work,
relationship between two users depends on their distance. A social contact
at a distance less than d can access any information encrypted by the user
for her contacts at distance d. Each user defines the maximum depth L
of her social relationships, generates keys for each distance, encrypts data
for her contacts at the desired distances, and makes the keys available to
the appropriate parties. However, to establish different relationships such as
friend, family, etc. a user defines L+ 1 keys for each relationship, making it
infeasible.
Luo et al. propose FaceCloak where users store random and fake data on
Facebook and the actual data in encrypted form on FaceCloak server [43].
Fake data from Facebook is used as an index to retrieve actual data from
FaceCloak on the client side. This design introduces redundant data storage
at two different servers. Beato et al. propose Scramble, which uses symmetric
key encryption to provide data confidentiality and integrity [44]. However,
Scramble also creates an access control list of users who are actually allowed
to see a piece of data by encrypting the symmetric key to each of them
separately. Hence, the approach is not expressive.
Anderson et al. propose a client-server architecture for providing social
network privacy [21]. In their design, the server is a very simple untrusted
social network provider which serves as a data container, while a complex
client side architecture performs the access control. The server only provides
availability and client is responsible for data confidentiality and integrity.
Besides content data, the architecture is also able to protect the social graph
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information.
Feldman et al. propose a framework called Frientegrity that primarily fo-
cuses on avoiding equivocation by the untrusted centralized social network
provider [45]. Users store their encrypted data with the provider, and ver-
ify the data integrity through a history of operations on the data and col-
laboration with other users. Although Frientegrity provides several desired
features of a security and privacy-aware social network, the provider is still
centralized, and therefore, may not have enough incentive to store user data.
Besides, access revocation is logarithmic with the number of friends a user
has. Also, provider can deduce an anonymous graph of relations between
users.
2.3 Decentralized Social Networking Architecture
Shakimov et al. consider a decentralized OSN as a privacy preserving alter-
native to the current centralized architectures [22]. The basic idea of their
decentralized OSN is that users store their data in a Virtual Independent
Server (VIS) owned by themselves. These VISs form an overlay network per
OSN. The authors consider different types of decentralized OSNs, depending
on where the VISs reside: a) cloud based b) desktop based c) hybrid, and
compare their privacy, costs and availability.
PeerSon, LotusNet, and Safebook [23–25], three decentralized designs for
social networking benefit from DHTs in their architecture. PeerSon and
Safebook suggest access control through encryption, but they fall short to
provide fine-grained policies compared to ABE-based access control. Safebook
is based on a peer-to-peer overlay network named Matryoshka. The end-to-
end privacy in Matryoshka is provided by leveraging existing hop-by-hop
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trust. In all of these schemes overhead of key revocation affects performance.
LotusNet [23] is a decentralized OSN based on a DHT called Likir [47], which
in turn is based on the base DHT Kademlia [48]. To provide access control,
Likir uses signed grants to specify permissions. Though it is based on a DHT
with untrusted nodes, it does not support any kind of encryption.
Diaspora is a decentralized client-server architecture for OSNs where each
user is considered to own a seed [26]. A seed is a web server, contains user
information, and can reside anywhere including the user’s machine and the
diaspora server. Diaspora defines three types of security level including high,
low, and no security at all. However, Diaspora is not based on a DHT and
uses symmetric key encryption for high security data. The access policies are
not fine-grained or expressive, and revocation is still a problem in Diaspora.
SCOPE is a distributed data management system for specialized P2P social
networks [46]. Clients connect to and store data on a group of super-nodes
with higher computation and storage capacity. However, clients do not par-
ticipate in the DHT; only the super-nodes run the DHT code. Clients connect
to super-nodes and rely on them for sharing and access control on their data.
Persona is a privacy-aware OSN architecture based on ABE [27]. Persona
uses a decentralized persistent storage medium, and puts policy decisions in
the hands of users by allowing them to choose with whom they store their
information. Users are empowered to create groups and are also able to me-
diate admission control in a group. Access to personal data is controlled by
encrypting to groups. Restricting data to specific groups allows users to have
fine-grained control over access policy. Users define relationships with their
social contacts by assigning attributes to them. For example, Alice might
assign the attributes friend and co-worker to Bob. Data is encrypted under
a policy defined over a set of attributes using potentially complex logical
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formulas. Users can only decrypt the data if they have enough attributes to
satisfy the policy. Though Persona introduces a desired property for OSN by
performing ABE, it does not scalably support dynamic groups. The major
problem is key revocation. Whenever someone leaves a group, Alice needs
to issue the remaining members new keys, and the entire data set may need




Encryption allows users to directly control access to their data by distributing
keys to the intended parties. Fine-grained access control is a key challenge
in this space; for example, Facebook and Livejournal have rolled out mech-
anisms to specify access control policies for each post, as the data items
are usually destined for a subset of friends, or groups. Persona [27] is a
state-of-the-art design that proposes the use of Attribute-based Encryption
(ABE) [49] to enable fine-grained access control. A user can create groups
by assigning different attributes and keys to her social contacts, and then en-
crypt data such that only particular users having the desired set of attributes
can decrypt it.
However, user attributes may change over time and access revocation be-
comes necessary. This could be because of change in location, work envi-
ronment, or the nature or strength of the relationship with a contact [50].
Recent studies have shown that the user interaction graph is much less dense
than friendship graph, indicating that users interact most frequently with
a small group of friends, further validating the need for fine grained access
control [51]. Moreover, the churn rate for the interaction graph has been
shown to be quite high, motivating the need for access control mechanisms
to support dynamic groups. Persona and similar designs introduce signifi-
cant overhead for group membership changes, especially when a contact is
removed from a group: all other members of the group must receive a new
key; additionally, all existing data items destined for that group must be re-
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encrypted. This does not scale when group sizes are large and group churn
rate is high.
Our first approach EASiER is a cryptographic scheme that enables users
to set fine-grained access control policies even for dynamic groups. To handle
group churn, we leverage ideas from the field of efficient revocation in group
communications systems [52] and apply them to the ABE setting. Our de-
sign makes use of a minimally trusted proxy that handles revoked users and
attributes. A user who revokes a contact or an attribute need not issue new
keys to the rest of the group, nor re-encrypt data. We believe this feature is
key for access control in OSNs, and would also be useful in any other context
where ABE is used together with highly dynamic group membership.
The proxy cannot decrypt by itself, and even if it were compromised, it
cannot allow previously revoked users to decrypt either (unless the compro-
mise crosses a proxy re-key operation). Therefore, a centralized OSN provider
can act as a proxy without introducing significant privacy risks. The only
assumption we hold is that the proxy is updated with a new key each time a
revocation takes place and that it discards the old one. We provide a proof
of the security of our construction, and present performance analysis that
demonstrate the efficiency of the scheme.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 Attribute-based Encryption
With standard public-key cryptography, it is necessary to explicitly enumer-
ate all of the users who may decrypt each data item. While it is possible
to issue group keys, this creates complex key management issues and several
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problems still remain. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [49,53,54] provides
a better solution for defining fine-grained access control to groups of people.
It provides an alternative approach to data protection, where the ability to
decrypt data items is controlled by a policy specified in terms of attributes.
For example, in Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [49] (one variant of ABE),
the encryptor uses a policy described over attributes to encrypt a piece of
data; different secret keys are issued for different sets of attributes, and a key
that has enough attributes to satisfy the policy decrypts the ciphertext.
For example, Alice encrypts a file with the policy “Professor OR (Teaching
Assistant AND Security)”, which means either a Professor, or a Teaching
Assistant in Security can decrypt this file. An example key with attributes
“Teaching Assistant, Security” that Alice issues can decrypt this file since it
satisfies the policy, but a key with just the “Teaching Assistant” attribute
cannot. This variant is called ciphertext-policy ABE; key-policy ABE reverses
the process, with attributes assigned to data items and policies to keys.
ABE explicitly prevents collusion between users: if Bob is a teaching assis-
tant in databases, and Carol is a research assistant in security, they cannot
combine their attributes together to satisfy the above policy if neither of
them satisfies it individually. Finally, ABE provides public-key functional-
ity, allowing, for example, Bob to encrypt a message with Alice’s public key
to be decrypted by the set of secret keys issued by Alice.
Various applications can benefit from the flexibility and expressiveness of
ABE, but require support for frequent revocation. ABE falls short in such
areas and when immediate revocation of access is required. Researchers have
proposed revocation by attaching an expiry date to the keys [49, 54], which
requires re-keying non-revoked users and re-encrypting old ciphertexts. They
also introduce delay in revocation.
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We can formally define a CP-ABE scheme with revocation by six algo-
rithms:
- Setup. This algorithm takes security parameters and generates a public
key PK and master secret key MK .
- Encrypt(PK ,M, P ). This algorithm takes the public key PK , a message
M , and a policy P and generates a ciphertext CT encrypted with P .
- Keygen(MK , S). This algorithm uses the master secret key MK to
generate a secret attribute key SK using the attributes in the set S.
- ProxyRekey(PK ,MK , U). This algorithm uses the public key PK and
master secret key MK to generate a proxy key PXK using the revoked users
in the set U .
- Convert(PXK ,CT , u). This algorithm, run by the proxy, converts the
ciphertext components in the set CT into a decryptable form CT ′ for the
user u using the proxy key PXK .
- Decrypt(CT ′, SK ). This algorithm decrypts a converted ciphertext CT ′
to plaintext M as long as the set of attributes S in SK satisfies the policy P
that was used to generate CT from M . (The policy is implicitly encoded in
CT .)
- Delegate(SK , S˜). The delegate algorithm in single authority setting
takes as input a secret key SK for some set of attributes S and a set S˜ ⊆ S.
It outputs a secret key ˜SK for the set of attributes S˜. The algorithm re-
randomizes the secret key and allows further delegation.
- DelegatedDecrypt(CT ′, ˜SK ). This algorithm decrypts a converted
ciphertext CT to plaintext M , as long as the set of attributes S˜ in ˜SK
satisfies the policy P that was used to generate CT from M .
We also consider a multi-authority delegation scenario. In this case, Alice
runs a key authority that issues a secret key to Bob, who himself runs a
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separate key authority that can delegate the key to Carol. Alice and Bob
each run separate proxies and Carol may decrypt only if Alice has not revoked
Bob and Bob has not revoked Carol.
- MA–Delegate(SK , S˜, M˜K ). This allows Bob to delegate his secret key
SK , issued by Alice for the set of attributes S, using his own master secret
key M˜K , producing a delegated key ˜SK , with attributes S˜ ⊂ S
- MA–DelegatedDecrypt(CT ′′, ˜SK ). This allows the owner of a dele-
gated key to decrypt a ciphertext CT ′′ that was obtained by first running
Convert using Alice’s proxy with key PXK , and then converting it again
using Bob’s proxy and key ˜PXK . The decryption succeeds if S˜ satisfies the
policy P used to encrypt the original ciphertext.
3.1.2 Revocation Scheme
To support practical revocation in EASiER, we adopt a scheme developed
by Naor and Pinkas [52] that allows efficient revocation of users. The scheme
uses Shamir secret sharing [55] to create shares of a secret key, where t + 1
shares are necessary for reconstruction, and gives one to each user. During
normal operation, the sender broadcasts t random shares, which lets any user
to reconstruct the secret key by combining the shares with his or her own.
To revoke up to t users, the sender broadcasts their shares instead of random
ones. Any non-revoked user still has t+1 distinct shares and can reconstruct
the private key, whereas the revoked users do not have enough information




Let G1, G2, and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and e a
map (G1×G2 → GT ). Let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and G2 respectively
(Gi = 〈gi〉). If ∀u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab and
e(g1, g2) 6= 1, then e is called a bilinear pairing. If G1 = G2, it is called a
symmetric pairing, otherwise the pairing is asymmetric.
Secret Sharing:
In Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [55], a secret s in some field F is shared
among n parties by creating a random polynomial P ∈ F [x] of degree t such
that P (0) = s. The i-th party gets the share (i, P (i)). Given any t+1 shares










Unlike traditional OSNs, social relationships in EASiER are of various types.
Users define relationships by assigning arbitrary set of attributes to their con-
tacts, act as their own key authorities, generate different secret keys for the
assigned attributes, and encrypt pieces of data such as profile information,
wall posts, etc. with attribute policies. An encrypted item can be decrypted
only by the contacts with keys that have enough attributes to satisfy the pol-
icy attached to the data. For instance, in Figure 3.1, user Alice defines the
attributes (friend, colleague, neighbor), generates the keys k1 (‘colleague’),
k2 (‘friend, neighbor’), and k3 (‘colleague, neighbor’) for u1, u2, and u3 re-
23
spectively. Therefore, u1 and u3 are in the colleague group, u2 and u3 are in
the ‘neighbor’ group, and u2 is in the ‘friend’ group of Alice. She encrypts
her data with the policy ‘colleague or (friend and neighbor)’.
Data 
k1 k2 k3 
Key Assignment 
u1 u2 u3 




KeyProxy (Revoke u1, u2) 
Proxy 
Modified CTcomponent 




Figure 3.1: EASiER Architecture
Revocation is a key functionality for OSNs, as relationships can and do
change over time: Alice may want to cease her relationship with u1 and u2,
and revoke the corresponding keys, which should prevent them from viewing
her data encrypted with any policy that their keys satisfy. Besides, she may
want to revoke the attribute ‘neighbor’ from k3 assigned to u3 and effect a
corresponding change in access control. EASiER makes use of a proxy that
is involved in every decryption. In summary, decryption keys in EASiER are
blinded in a way specific to each user’s identity; to decrypt a data item, a user
with the appropriate key must contact the proxy to transform the ciphertext
partially so that it is compatible with the blinded key. When Alice wishes
to revoke an attribute, she updates the proxy key in such a way that this
transformation is impossible for the revoked users.
The proxy itself is minimally trusted and cannot decrypt the data; it also
cannot restore access for a previously revoked user even if it is compromised,
and so it may be implemented by a centralized service with minimal risk.
Upon each revocation, Alice rekeys her proxy with the latest revocation in-
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formation. A new proxy key, created each time a revocation takes place,
prevents revoked users from colluding with the proxy or with each other to
get the data. We argue that this is a desirable property: currently trusted
contacts are not likely to crawl the entire set of social network data and
store it for later use, but former friends or colleagues might try to abuse





The master key MK contains a polynomial P of degree t. Each user u gets
a random share P (u) of P (0) in her key. The proxy key consists of t such
random shares and is used to convert a part of the ciphertext for decryption.
Whenever an access is revoked from a key SK, its share becomes a part of the
proxy key, and hence the converted ciphertext. Therefore, the revoked user
does not have (t + 1) distinct points to unblind her key and the ciphertext.
However, non-revoked users always have (t + 1) distinct points and hence
decrypt successfully.
When no one is revoked, the proxy key consists of t random P (x) points.
Since the revocation is based on polynomial secret sharing with a polynomial
of degree t, the scheme is limited to a maximum of t key revocations. The
total number of users in the system, however, is not limited.
- Setup: The setup algorithm randomly generates a polynomial P of
degree t over Zp, where p = |G1|, sets the secret P (0), and randomly chooses
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α, β ∈ Zp. The public key PK and master secret key MK are generated as
follows. This is directly adapted from BSW CP-ABE, modifying it to use
asymmetric pairings and adding the polynomial component to the secret key.
PK =
(
G1,G2, g1, g2, h = gβ1 , e(g1, g2)α
)
,MK = (β, gα2 ,P)
- Encrypt(PK ,M, τ): A policy is represented as an access tree structure τ
with the attributes at leaves and threshold k-of-n gates at intermediate nodes.
Each node x is associated with a polynomial qx of degree dx (dx = k − 1 for
that node). The random secret s (s ∈ Zp) to blind the data M is associated
with the polynomial at the root R of the tree; i.e., qR(0) = s. For all other
nodes, qx(0) = qparent(x)(index (x)). index (x) returns a number between 1 and
the number of children of parent(x). Y is the set of leaf nodes in τ .
Other than the asymmetric groups, the encryption algorithm works exactly
the same as in BSW CP-ABE. H : {0, 1}∗ → G2 is a hash function (modeled
as random oracle) that maps string attributes to random elements of G2, and
hy = logg2 H(att(y)), used for notational convenience only, as it is assumed
infeasible to compute.
CT = (τ, C˜ = Me(g1, g2)
αs, C = hs = gβs1 ,
∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0)1 , C ′y = H(att(y))qy(0) = ghyqy(0)2 )
- KeyGen(MK,S): The key generation algorithm outputs the secret key
corresponding to the set of attributes S for the user uk, blinded by P (0).
uk and D
′′
j are the extra components generated by this algorithm compared
to the same algorithm in BSW CP-ABE. The component D′′j contains user
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information uk (a point on P ). uk does not need to be secret since P is secret.
SK = (D, ∀j ∈ S : 〈Dj, D′j,D′′j 〉, uk),
D = g
(α+r)/β
2 , Dj = g
r
2H(j)










- ProxyRekey(PK,MK, {u1, . . . , ur}): This algorithm takes a list (pos-
sibly empty) of revoked users, with 0 ≤ r ≤ t and evaluates the corresponding
P (ui) using MK . In case of fewer than t revocations, it generates random
points x (other than the actual user identities) and calculates P (x). The
secret proxy key PXK is set as follows:
PXK ={ui, P (ui)}, 1 ≤ i ≤ r
{xi, P (xi)}, r < i ≤ t, for random xi
- Convert(PXK , CT ): This algorithm, run by the proxy, takes as input
the proxy key PXK , the ciphertext CT , and the decryptor’s identity uk to
calculate C ′′y as follows:
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, k /∈ {1, . . . , t}, λi = uk




(uj − ui) ,
∀y ∈ Y : C ′′y = (C ′y)
∑t





Since SK is blinded by P (0), the user needs C ′′y in addition to Cy and C
′
y for
decryption. The algorithm also calculates λk for the decryptor uk, so CT
′ =
{CT , {∀y ∈ Y : Cy}, λk}. Note that in practice, only the C ′y components of
the ciphertext need to be passed to the proxy.
- Decrypt(CT ′, SK ): The decryption steps involve one extra pairing than
BSW CP-ABE at each leaf node of the policy. For each leaf node x where
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i = att(x) and C ′′x ∈ C ′′, if i ∈ S, (S is the set of attributes for which SK is
issued) then,
DecryptNode(CT , SK , x) =
e(Cx, Di)























, k 6∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}
= e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)
Otherwise DecryptNode returns ⊥. The rest of the decryption proceeds as
BSW CP-ABE.
Explanation of Asymmetric Group:
We use different groups for C ′i andD
′
i. The user gets C
′








j=1 λjP (uj), explained in the Convert algorithm) by the proxy.
However, if both C ′i and D
′
i belong to the same group, and the user gives
the proxy D′i instead of C
′
i, she will get (D
′
i)
a = gari . She will also get λk,
which she can use to get D′′i
λk = gλkP (uk)ri . Multiplying these two, she gets
gri(a+λkP (uk)) = griP (0). She can use this last value to decrypt any ciphertext
without using the proxy, so the revocation is no longer effective. Therefore,
we use asymmetric pairing, where C ′i and D
′
i are in different groups and
mapping of D′i into the C
′
i group is not possible, also known as External
Diffie Hellman Assumption (XDH).
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3.3.2 Delegation of Access
We design delegation of attributes in EASiER in two settings depending on
whether the secret keys are issued by a) single key authority, or b) multiple
key authorities.
- Delegate(SK , S˜). The delegation algorithm takes in a secret key SK
issued for a set of attributes S to user uk, and generates a delegated key ˜SK
for the subset of attributes S˜ ⊆ S. As long as uk is not revoked, the delegated
key can be used for decryption. An extra public parameter f = g
1/β
2 is
introduced in the public key PK. Some components in SK are re-randomized
and a new component D′′′j is introduced. Let random r˜ ∈ Zp, and random
∀j ∈ S˜, r˜j ∈ Zp. ˜SK is set as follows.
˜SK = (D˜, ∀j ∈ S˜ : 〈D˜j, D′j, D′′j , D′′′j 〉),
D˜ = (D)f r˜ = g
(α+r+r˜)/β
2 , D˜j = (Dj)g
r˜
2H(j)
r˜j , D′′′j = g
r˜j
1
- DelegatedDecrypt(CT ′, ˜SK ). Decryption proceeds as follows. For
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each leaf node x and C ′′x ∈ C ′′:
DecryptNode(CT, ˜SK , x)
=
e(Cx, D˜i)






























, k 6∈ {1, 2, . . . , t}
= e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)qx(0)
Let A = e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)qR(0) = e(g1, g2)
(r+r˜)s for the root node. The rest of the









- MA-Delegate(SK, S˜, M˜K ). Recall that in this case, Bob is in posses-
sion of a secret key SK issued by Alice, and is simultaneously in charge of
a separate key authority with master key M˜K . In this case, Bob creates a
new identity u′ for another user Carol and re-randomizes the delegated key:
S˜ ⊆ S.








where P˜ is the polynomial in M˜K , and u′ is Carol’s identity.
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- MA-Decrypt(CT ′′, ˜SK ). To decrypt a ciphertext CT using a delegated
key, first Alice’s proxy converts CT producing {C ′′y = C ′XAy }, λA. Then Bob’s
proxy converts it further, based on identity u′, to obtain {C ′′′y = C ′XBy }, λB.
Bob’s identity is conveyed to Carol as a part of the communication for
˜SK , or some other way. Carol does a modified bilinear pairing in the
DecryptNode, and finally decrypts the data.




























The rest of the decryption proceeds as before. If Alice revokes Bob, or
Bob revokes Carol, the decryption will not succeed since both Alice and
Bob’s proxies participate in the decryption, and the delegated secret key ˜SK
contains information about all Alice, Bob, and Carol.
3.3.3 Attribute Revocation
In this section, we describe attribute revocation from a given secret key in
a limited universe. This is useful since often the key authority may want to
merely revoke a few attributes from her contacts instead of the whole key.
For instance, in a social network, user A might want to remove colleague
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attribute from B, but B still stays a friend.
Intuition:
The master secret key contains one polynomial Pi of degree ti for each possi-
ble attribute i that the key authority defines in her universe. Any attribute
can be introduced later by generating a new polynomial and storing it in
MK. Pi(0) is used to blind the corresponding attribute in the secret keys.
Each user u also gets a random share Pi(u) of Pi(0) in her key. The proxy
key consists of ti such shares for each attribute in the policy used in the
ciphertext. Whenever some attribute is revoked from some user, that share
becomes a part of the proxy key, and hence the converted ciphertext. There-
fore, the revoked user does not have enough points, i.e. (ti + 1) points for
that specific attribute to unblind her key and the ciphertext, and thus fails
to decrypt it. Non-revoked users always have (ti + 1) distinct shares for
attribute i, and so decrypt successfully. When no attribute is revoked, the
proxy key consists of ti random points for each attribute i.
- Setup: The setup algorithm randomly generates a polynomial Py of
degree ty over Zp for each attribute y ∈ Y where Y is the set of attributes
in the system, sets the secret Py(0), and randomly chooses α, β ∈ Zp. The
public key PK and master secret key MK are generated as follows:
PK = (G1,G2, g1, g2, h = gβ1 , e(g1, g2)α),MK = (β, gα2 ,∀y∈Y : Py)
- KeyGen(MK, S, {Px}): The algorithm KeyGen takes MK and a list
of polynomials {Px} (possibly empty) for new attributes not in MK, and
outputs the secret key corresponding to the set of attributes S for the user uk.
It also updates MK with the new attributes ({Px}). The polynomial in each
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key component is specific to the attribute represented by that component.
SK = (D, ∀j ∈ S : 〈Dj, D′j, D′′j 〉), where D = g(α+r)/β2 ,
Dj = g
r
2 ·H(j)rjPj(0) = gr+hjrjPj(0)2 , D′j = grj1 , D′′j = (D′j)Pj(uk) = grjPj(uk)1
- Encrypt(PK, M, τ): The encryption algorithm works as in key revo-
cation.
- ProxyRekey(PK, MK, ∀y ∈ Y : RLy): This algorithm takes a list of
revoked users RLy = {ui}, 1 ≤ i ≤ ty for each attribute y ∈ Y , and generates
the proxy key PXK. In case of fewer than ty revocations, random values
〈x, Py(x)〉 are generated to make RLy of size ty. The set of users from whom
different attributes are revoked, may or may not overlap. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the sets of revoked users don’t overlap.
PXK = ∀y ∈ Y, ∀ui ∈ RLy : 〈ui, Py(ui)〉
- Convert(PXK, ∀y ∈ Y : Cy): This algorithm is run by the proxy to
convert the ciphertext components C ′y to C
′′
y for the user uk. ∀y ∈ Y , the
algorithm also calculates λyk for uk.
λyi =
uk




(uj − ui) ,∀ui, uj ∈ RLy, uk /∈ RLy, RLy ∈ PXK











- Decrypt(CT, SK): For each leaf node x where i = attr(x), i ∈ S (S is
the set of attributes for which SK is issued), i is not revoked from uk, and
Pi is a polynomial of degree ti for the attribute i, the algorithm proceeds as
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follows:
DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) =
e(Cx, Di)















, k 6∈ {1, 2, . . . , ti}
= e(g1, g2)
rqx(0)
Otherwise DecryptNode returns ⊥. The rest of the decryption proceeds as
before. In summary, if an attribute i is revoked from user u, he can not do
pairing on C ′′x and D
′
i. He can continue to use components related to his
other unrevoked attributes. Therefore, some of his attributes are revoked
whereas some continue to be active.
3.3.4 Distribution of the Proxy
In our design, the proxy is semi-trusted. We assume that the proxy is updated
with a new proxy key with each revocation, and it forgets the old keys.
In order to enhance proxy security, we propose an alternate design to a
centralized proxy. An alternate design to a centralized proxy is a threshold-
based distributed proxy.
Threshold secret sharing can be used to split the proxy functionality among
several parties. This model, where we can assume that majority of the parties
are not actively malicious, will ensure the security of the proxy. With (t, n)
threshold proxies, i.e., proxy functionality is distributed to n parties with t
as the threshold value, (t < n), t + 1 out of n proxies need to be malicious,
i.e., colluding with the decryptor, to allow a revoked user to decrypt data.
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3.4 Security Analysis
First, we need to define the requisite security properties for CP-ABE with
Proxy Revocation. We present the definition for identity-based revocation;
the definition for attribute-based revocation is analogous. We base our def-
inition on the security model defined by Bethencourt et al. [49], with the
addition of revocation and proxy operations. In this game, all encryptions
remain secure even when the adversary compromises the proxy and obtains
its key material, as long as this happens after the most recent revocation.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the public
parameters, PK, to the adversary. The challenger also runs the Prox-
yRekey(PK,MK, ∅) algorithm to generate a proxy key PXK.
Phase 1. The adversary makes repeated queries to Keygen to obtain keys
for users u1, . . . , uq1 with sets of attributes S1, . . . , Sq1 . The adversary also
interacts with the proxy by calling Convert with the input ({C ′1, . . . C ′r}, uk)
for C ′i ∈ G1 and uk ∈ Zp, at which point the challenger runs the Convert
algorithm with the stored proxy key PXK. Finally, the adversary may
call ProxyRekey by supplying a revocation list RL. This will cause the
challenger to update the proxy key PXK.
Challenge. The adversary submits two equal length messages M0 and M1
and an access structure A∗. The adversary also supplies a new revocation
list RL∗. RL∗ and A∗ satisfy the constraint that, for each user uk, either
uk ∈ RL∗ or Sk does not satisfy A∗.
The challenger flips a coin to obtain a random bit b and returns Mb en-
crypted with the access structure A∗. Additionally, it runs ProxyRekey
(PK,MK,RL) and returns the resulting key PXK to the adversary.
Phase 2. The adversary makes repeated queries to Keygen to obtain keys
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for users uq1+1, . . . , uq2 with attribute sets Sq1+1, . . . , Sq2 . The new keys have
to satisfy that if uk /∈ RL∗, then Sk does not satisfy A∗.
Guess. The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversary is defined as Pr[b′ = b]− 1
2
.
Definition 1 A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption with proxy re-
vocation scheme is secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most
negligible advantage in the above game.
3.4.1 Proof Sketch
We can prove the security of our scheme using a variant of a generic bilinear
group model. Note that since the security of the original CP-ABE scheme
relies on the generic bilinear group model, the assumption we make is only
slightly stronger than the original. In particular, we must work within an
asymmetric bilinear group, with a pairing of e : G1 × G2 → GT , such that
there is no efficiently computable isomorphism from G1 to G2. (In a symmet-
ric bilinear group, a user could submit D′j to Convert and recover g
rjP (0)
0 ,
obviating the need to use the proxy in further decryptions.) This is believed
to hold true for MNT curves [56].
The generic asymmetric bilinear group model. Consider three random
encodings of the additive group Fp represented by injective maps ψ1, ψ2, ψT :
Fp → {0, 1}m, where m > 3 log p. We will define G1,G2,GT as the range of
the respective map. We are given access to a group action oracle for each
group and an oracle for a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT
(we will refer to the ranges of ψ1, ψ2, ψT as G1,G2,GT , respectively). We are
also given oracle access to the isomorphism φ : G2 → G1 and a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → G2. Finally, we let gi = ψi(1) for i = 1, 2.
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Theorem 1 The construction presented in Section 5.3 is secure under the
generic asymmetric bilinear group model.
We sketch the main argument here; most of the rest of the details are similar
to the proof presented by Bethencourt et al. [49].
First of all, we can assume that no “unexpected collisions” happen be-
tween the maps, meaning that if we keep track of the algebraic expressions
passed to ψ1, ψ2, ψT , and φ, two values are equal if and only if the expressions
are symbolically equivalent. This assumption is true except for a negligible
probability.
For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that A∗ contains a single
attribute Aj for some j. Then after phase 2, the adversary has the following
elements available:
G1 : g1, gβ1 , C = g
βs









where s is the random secret used to encrypt the challenge message and hj
is implicitly defined such that H(j) = g
hj
2 .
G2 : g2, D = g
(α+ruk )/β










for each queried user uk where Aj ∈ Sk. Note that we can ignore all Dj′ for
j′ 6= j because, as with CP-ABE, they will not help with decryption.
GT : e(g1, g2)α,M · e(g1, g2)αs
In addition, the adversary knows uk, P (uk) for all the revoked users in
RL∗. Note that we can ignore any other elements of G1 obtained through
calls to Convert during Phase 1, or through calls to the isomorphism. This
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is because in order to guess correctly with a non-negligible probability, the
adversary needs to compute e(g1, g2)
αs. Since there are no occurrences of s




The adversary can compute e(C,D(u)) = e(g1, g2)
αs+rus, hence computing
e(g1, g2)
αs is equivalent to computing e(g1, g2)
rus for some user u. Note also
that the secret keys obtained for other users are not helpful here, for the













where x, y, and z are derived from the available elements other than D
(u)
j .
Note that x, y 6= 0, since otherwise there is no way to introduce ru into the
right-hand side. However, the rest of the values are independent of P (0),
since the only values of the polynomial available to the adversary outside of
D
(u)
j are P (uk) for uk ∈ RL∗, and thus are not sufficient to determine P (0).
3.5 Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented the constructions in EASiER, as described in Section 5.3.
We took the BSW CP-ABE toolkit [57] as base, and implemented the re-
vocation scheme. The current implementation supports key revocation and
access delegation for the multiple authorities setting. Similar techniques can
be applied to perform attribute revocation.
The implementation uses MNT curves [58] with 159-bit base field. The
experiments were performed on an emulab 1 d710 machine with 2.40 GHz
1http://www.emulab.net
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64-bit Quad Core Xeon processor running Ubuntu 10.04. We also imple-
mented a Facebook application to provide the functionality on a social net-
work. The code for EASiER and the Facebook application are available
at https://bitbucket.org/hatswitch/easier and https://bitbucket.
org/hatswitch/easier-fb respectively.
3.5.1 Performance Analysis
We provide some information on the performance evaluation of EASiER, and
compare it with BSW CP-ABE. Though CP-ABE implementation uses sym-
metric pairing, we use asymmetric pairing for both EASiER and CP-ABE
in our implementation. This provides security by preventing key and cipher-
text components exchange. The comparison results are shown in Figure 3.2,
revocation/proxy re-keying time and the time to convert ciphertext by the
proxy in EASiER are shown in Figure 3.3, and finally, the time to delegate
keys and decrypt with a delegated key are shown in Figure 3.4.
Key Generation: Key generation time is linear with number of attributes
both in BSW CP-ABE and EASiER. EASiER does extra exponentiation,
and generates an extra component for each attribute. BSW CP-ABE with
supersingular curve requires the least time as expected.
Encryption: To test encryption and decryption, we generated 10 different
policies with a random combination of ands and ors, and attributes randomly
chosen from {attr1, attr2, . . . , attr100} for each of the desired number of leaves
(1, 5, 10, . . . 100). An example policy is “attr1 and (attr2 or attr3 or (attr4
and attr5))”. Encryption is also linear with respect to the number of leaf
nodes in the policy. Since encryption is same in both the schemes, BSW























































Figure 3.2: Performance Analysis: Comparison of EASiER with
BSW-CPABE. Number of the revoked users is set to 500. (a) Secret key
generation depends on the number of attributes in the key. (b) Encryption
depends on the number of leaf nodes in the policy. (c) Decryption depends
on the type of policy used to encrypt and the number of leaf nodes in the
policy.
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Decryption: Decryption depends on the policy used in encryption, and
the attributes involved. We generated a decryption key with 100 attributes,
i.e., the superset of all the attributes used to generate the policies, and so it
satisfies each of the policies used in encryption. The decryption results are
shown with a 95% confidence interval. All the lines show the performance
when an optimization was used to ensure the usage of the minimum number
of leaves in the algorithm DecryptNode.
Proxy Rekey and Conversion: EASiER involves two extra costs before
decryption: re-keying the proxy and converting the ciphertext components
specific to the leaves in the policy. The re-keying results (Figure 3.3a) show
that for even 1 000 revoked users, the time required is around 0.8 second.
This should be compared with the time required to rekey the rest of the
group, i.e., generate a new key for everyone, when even one person in the
group is revoked. The latter number depends on group size and number of
attributes in the key. For example, to rekey a group of size 100 each with a
key size of 20 attributes in CP-ABE-singular curve setting (Figure 3.2a), the
time will be 22 seconds (100× 0.22).
Conversion primarily involves one exponentiation for each of the leaf spe-
cific ciphertext components. It also calculates λk for the requester uk, and
completes the λis for each of the revoked users. We perform an optimization
by allowing the proxy to pre-calculate a portion of the λi’s in the Convert
algorithm. With the optimization, the proxy needs to do 1 multiplication


























































Leaf Nodes in Policy
Conversion
(c) Ciphertext Conversion by Proxy
Figure 3.3: Performance Analysis: Time Required for Revocation/Rekeying
the Proxy and Ciphertext Conversion. (a) Generating proxy key depends
on the number of revoked users. (b) Partial pre-calculation of ciphertext
conversion depends on the number of users revoked (c) Ciphertext
conversion depends on the number of leaf nodes in policy and is hardly










(uk − ui)P (ui) = λiP (ui),∀ ui ∈ RL, uk 6∈ RL
Figure 3.3b shows the time required for the proxy to do the pre-calculation.
Note that this is a one-time cost each time the proxy is re-keyed and is not
faced by users. Figure 3.3c shows the time required to actually convert a
ciphertext. The result depends on the number of leaf nodes and is hardly
affected by the number of revoked users, since the time to do exponentiations
for the leaf nodes dominates the time to do t multiplications to calculate λis.
Figure 3.3c shows the time for 1000 revoked users. Conversion of each leaf
node can be performed in parallel, so using a multi-core machine or a cloud-
based service can drastically reduce the delay experienced by users during
this operation. A user performing decryption only faces the conversion time
shown in Figure 3.3c along with the decryption time mentioned earlier.
Key Delegation: We generated a key with 100 attributes and delegated
various number of attributes from this key. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 3.4a. The delegation time depends on the number of attributes delegated.
To delegate 100 attributes from this key, it requires 0.18 second.
Decryption with Delegated Key: As in regular decryption, decryp-
tion with a delegated key depends on the policy used in encryption, and the
attributes involved (Figure 3.4b). We used the same ciphertexts that we used
in regular decryption. We decrypted the ciphertexts with the delegated keys
that we generated by delegating various number of attributes from a key with
100 attributes. The results are shown with a 95% confidence interval. Note
that, to decrypt with a delegated key, a user has to face two additional time
































Leaf Nodes in Policy
Delegated Decryption
(b) Decryption with Delegated Key
Figure 3.4: Performance Analysis: Time Required for Key Delegation and
Decryption with Delegated Key. The number of revoked users is set to 500.
(a) Key delegation depends on the number of delegated attributes. (b)
Decryption with delegated key depends on the type of policy used to
encrypt and the number of leaf nodes in the policy.
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Component Size and Communication Overhead: Table 3.1 shows
the sizes of the components involved in the system. Elements fromG0,G1,G2,
and Zp require 44, 124, 124, and 24 bytes respectively to represent (Table 3.1a).
Users have to communicate with the proxy for conversion by sending C ′y, and
receiving C ′′y . These are represented using elements from G1. This requires
124 bytes to represent (120 for the actual data, and 4 for the variable size).
Hence, conversion of a ciphertext with l leaf nodes in the policy will need to
transfer 124l bytes each way. The user also sends uk, and receives λk back.
These are represented using Zp which requires 24 bytes.
Public Key consists of a string describing the pairing used (980 bytes), g0
and h from G0, g1 from G1, and e(g0, g1)α from G2. Master Key consists
of β from Zp, and g1α from G1 in CP-ABE. In EASiER, it also consists
of a polynomial of degree t. The polynomial consists of an integer t, and
t + 1 coefficients from Zp. Private Key consists of D from G1, number of
attributes n (integer), and n of 〈Dj, D′j〉s from G1 and G0 respectively and
attributes of length a (string) . EASiER also contains n of D′′j from G0.
Ciphertext consists of C˜ from G2, C from G0, and components for each node
in the policy. Both intermediate (i nodes) and leaf (l nodes) nodes have a
threshold k (integer), and number of children (0 for leaf, also an integer). A
leaf node has a string attribute of length a, and Cy and C
′
y from G0 and G1
respectively. Proxy Key consists of t Zp elements.
Attribute Revocation: We can estimate the time required to perform
attribute revocation. All the algorithms work similarly. The only extra work
is in Setup where instead of just one polynomial, a polynomial is generated
for each attribute in the system. It requires 0.34sec to generate a polynomial
of degree 500 and increases linearly with the degree of the polynomial. Hence,
generating a polynomial for each attribute is scalable.
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Component EASiER (bytes) CP-ABE (bytes)
Public Key 1316 1316
Master Key 152 + (t+ 1)24 148
Private Key 128 + (a+ 212)n 128 + (a+ 168)n
Ciphertext 168 + 8i+ (176 + a)l 168 + 8i+ (176 + a)l
Proxy Key 24t NA
C ′′y 124l NA
3.5.2 Facebook Application
Finally, we developed a Facebook application for our protocol. In the cur-
rent implementation, all protocol functions are performed at our application
server. Moreover for convenience, we chose the client’s proxy server to be
the application server itself. When a user first installs our Facebook appli-
cation, an account is created in the application database. The application
retrieves public profile information of the users who install it using Facebook





Attrapadung and Imai address the revocation problem in [59] by combining
broadcast encryption scheme with both CP-ABE and KP-ABE. This scheme
requires knowledge about the list of all possible users during encryption,
i.e., attaches one component per user to the ciphertext. Knowing the list of
all possible users in advance is inconvenient for most scenarios, specifically
OSNs. Bethencourt et al. in [49] and Boldyreva et al. in [60] propose
expiration-based revocation scheme for CP-ABE and KP-ABE respectively.
In these schemes, the secret keys (CP-ABE) or the ciphertext (KP-ABE)
contain expiry time as an extra attribute. Time-based revocation may not
be a desired property in several applications where an immediate revocation
is necessary. It introduces a window of vulnerability, i.e., the gap between the
desired time from revocation to the actual time of revocation. Ostrovsky et
al. [61] present a new KP-ABE scheme with non-monotonic access structure
to support negation of attributes. Revocation can be implemented by adding
a NOT-attribute to the policy in private key. However, this will require re-
keying the users from whom an attribute is revoked.
Lewko et al. in [62] propose a revocation scheme with small private keys.
However, their approach also increases the size of the ciphertext by incorpo-
rating the list of revoked and unrevoked users with it. In [63] Hur proposes
a revocation scheme for CP-ABE where each leaf node, i.e. attribute in the
policy used to encrypt the data contains a group of users who possess that
attribute. The scheme consists of a key generation center (KGC) and a data
storing center (DSC). The DSC is equivalent to the proxy in our proposed
scheme. However, the approach requires secret key update for all the users
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of an attribute group from which at least one user was revoked; this also
includes the non-revoked users in that group.
The CCA secure construction of Yu et al. [64] involves updating the master
key component of each attribute that has been revoked in the system. The
public key components are then updated and data is encrypted with the
new public key. Finally, proxy re-keys are generated that enable a proxy
to update the user secret keys to the new version for all but the revoked
user. Basically the re-keying burden is placed on the proxy, instead of users.
We note that the existing data would need to be re-encrypted by the proxy;
placing a significant burden on the system. While our scheme is only CPA
secure under the generic group model (weaker security than Yu et al.), it
does not require re-encryption of existing data.
3.6.2 Proxy-based Re-encryption
Our revocation techniques are based on the notion of proxy re-encryption.
We will now briefly trace some developments in this field, and discuss why
the state of the art techniques cannot be directly applied to our setting.
Blaze et al. [65] introduced the notion of proxy re-encryption, in which a
proxy could convert a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext for Bob, using a
specially generated proxy key. The holders of public-key pairs A (Alice) and
B (Bob) publish a proxy key piA→B such that D(pi(E(m, eA), piA→B), dB) =
m, where E(m, e) is the public encryption function of message m under
encryption key e, D(c, d) is the decryption function of ciphertext c under
decryption key d, pi(c, piA→B) is the proxy function that converts ciphertext
c according to proxy key piA→B, and eA, eB, dA, dB are the public encryption
and secret decryption component keys for key pairs A and B, respectively. In
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the El-Gamal based construction proposed by Blaze et al., while the proxy
cannot see the plaintext message m, it can collude with B to recover the
secret key for A. Moreover, the construction is bidirectional, and the proxy
key can be used to convert ciphertext for Bob into a ciphertext for Alice as
well.
Ateniese et al. [66] propose unidirectional protocols for proxy re-encryption
based on bilinear maps, where a re-encryption key from A to B does not im-
ply a re-encryption key from B to A. Canetti and Hohenberger [67] proposed
the first CCA secure bidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme, while Libert
and Vergnaud [68] proposed the first CCA secure unidirectional proxy re-
encryption scheme in the standard model. We note that all of the above
schemes are limited to the public key setting. Green and Ateniese [69] ex-
tended the model to the identity based setting by proposing a scheme for
identity based proxy re-encryption, but it was not until Liang et al. [70] that
the attribute based encryption setting was considered.
In the attribute based setting of Liang et al., a user could designate a proxy,
who can re-encrypt a ciphertext with a certain access policy into another
ciphertext with a different access policy. Furthermore, the authors showed
their scheme to be selective-structure chosen plaintext secure. However, it is
not possible to apply their construction to the problem of attribute revocation
because their construction does not support negative attributes.
3.7 Conclusion
We present an access control architecture for Online Social Networks, named
EASiER, that supports efficient revocation in attribute-based encryption.
We achieve this revocation scheme by introducing a semi-trusted proxy, lever-
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aging ideas from a group communication scheme, and combining it with ABE.
Although we showed our approach in an OSN setting, it can be applied to
any context where ABE is used for data protection with dynamic group mem-
bership. We implemented the scheme and compared it with Bethencourt et
al.’s Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). Our results
show that EASiER is scalable in terms of computation and communication
for OSNs; accordingly, we have built a prototype and a Facebook application
to provide such encryption.
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4 DECENT
Our second proposed approach is called DECENT, an architecture for en-
forcing access control in a decentralized OSN. Our focus is on providing data
confidentiality, integrity, and availability in the presence of malicious nodes
in a distributed setting. Our architecture is also able to protect the pri-
vacy of user relationships. Users consider their social contacts to be sensitive
information, evidenced by the public outcry when Google Buzz made this
information public, and was forced to change its default settings [29]. Alter-
native decentralized designs [23–26] remove reliance on a central entity, but
have not adequately tackled confidentiality and access control issues.
DECENT is based around a flexible object-oriented design (OOD) that
supports the main functionality of OSNs and captures the complex multi-
principal interactions that are common in social networks. The confidential-
ity and integrity of data are protected by a cryptographic mechanism so that
they can be stored in untrusted nodes in a distributed hash table (DHT).
The standard DHT mechanisms are extended to ensure availability despite
malicious attempts to erase or overwrite stored data.
Our contribution is twofold:
1) Design: We propose a decentralized OSN architecture that: i) pro-
vides flexibility in data management through OOD; ii) uses an appropriate
and advanced cryptographic scheme that supports efficient access revocation
and fine-grained policies on each piece of data; and iii) combines confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability by using the functionalities of a DHT—all
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the existing designs focus on one or two, but not all of these aspects. The
novelty of our architecture lies in integration of existing primitives that are
tailored to enhance the security and privacy of OSNs.
2) Prototype: We develop a prototype of DECENT—the wall and news-
feed functionalities, to be specific—and evaluate its performance through
simulation and experiments on PlanetLab. We evaluate DECENT using a
FreePastry simulator and a Kademlia implementation on PlanetLab [71,72].
Our analysis shows that the performance overhead of DECENT is accept-
able, and that our architecture for privacy-preserving decentralized OSNs is
feasible. For example, although a wall with 60 objects needs 90 s to be viewed
by its owner, contents can be displayed progressively; i.e., older messages
can be fetched while the user is reading the most recent messages, which are
loaded within the first few seconds. Our architecture thus demonstrates that
existing security primitives with well understood properties can be leveraged
to provide a compelling privacy-preserving alternative to centralized OSNs.
4.1 Functional Model
Much of the functionality of OSNs can be described as users posting con-
tent and their social contacts viewing, commenting on, and annotating such
content. To provide a flexible, general model of these operations, we define
a container object that has two components: the main content and a list of
comments/annotations, represented as references to other container objects.
The main content can take on many types, such as a status update, a shared
link, a photo or video, or a collection of container objects (e.g., a photo al-
bum). For our purpose, the content type is not important; the key difference
is that the access permissions on the comments can be more restrictive than
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the content to enforce the policy of each object and owner individually.
A user’s profile is a root object, which contains references to other objects,
such as contact information, a wall, photo albums, etc. Similarly, other
objects may consist of some content and references to other objects. For
example, a wall may have references to status messages and posts where a
status/post object may contain references to comment objects in addition
to the status data. Thus, each user’s content is organized in a hierarchical
fashion (although we do not enforce a tree structure—a single object may
be referenced by multiple “parent” objects). With this degree of granularity
in our object design, access permissions can be assigned specifically for each
object and then referenced by other containers.
4.2 Architecture
DECENT is a decentralized OSN, which employs a DHT to store and retrieve
data objects created by their owners. Each object is encrypted to provide
confidentiality. The primary advantage of our architecture is its modularity,
i.e., the data objects, the cryptographic mechanisms, and the DHT are three
separate components, interacting with each other through well-defined inter-
faces. The modular design allows us to separate the various cryptographic
implementations (ABE, signatures) from the basic object model (container
objects, permissions, etc.) and use any type of DHT.
4.2.1 Access Policies
Each object has three access policies associated with it. The policies are
either attribute-based (AB), identity-based (IB), or a combination of both
types. AB policies take the standard form of policies described through var-
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ious attributes, for example, friend, family, coworker. AB policies can rep-
resent formulas over attributes, using operators such as ∧, ∨, and k-of-n. Ex-
amples of AB policy are: (friend ∧ coworker) ∨ family, and 2 of {friend , family ,
coworker} (background on Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) is provided in
section 4.2.2).
• Read policy (R-Policy) describes who may read the contents of the
object. It is an AB policy that describes the attribute combination
required for a user to decrypt an object’s data.
• Write policy (W-Policy) describes who may modify the contents of the
object or delete the object. It is an IB policy, which generally is set to
the owner of the object.
• Append policy (A-Policy) describes who may add a comment/annotation
to the object. It is also an AB policy.
These policies are defined by the owner at the time of object creation and
are stored in the object metadata. The read policy is enforced through the
use of cryptography. The write and append policies are enforced through a
combination of cryptography and specialized DHT functionality (mentioned
later). A reader can cryptographically verify the integrity of the object and be
sure that the content and comments have been posted by parties authorized
by the write and append policies, respectively. Additionally, the DHT storage
nodes require authorization before each write operation to prevent malicious
deletions and vandalism.
The authorization does not reveal a user’s identity, hence the storage node
is not aware of the identities of users storing or retrieving data from it, and
therefore a user’s social graph is hidden from the storage nodes. DHT nodes
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also implement a special append operation that adds a new annotation to
the object while leaving existing content unmodified. When objects are being
stored at malicious nodes, confidentiality is still preserved due to cryptogra-
phy. However, the malicious nodes can impact the integrity and availability
guarantees by deviating from the protocol, e.g., by deleting objects and/or
returning previous versions of objects. Malicious nodes in the DHT can be
tolerated using replication.
We support fine-grained policies meaning that a separate policy can be
enforced on each object, access revocation is efficient, and comments have
more restrictive policies than the parent object. For example, when Bob
comments on Alice’s status, the comment may have its own policy different
than Alice’s policy on the status object. To view the comment, a viewer has
to satisfy both Alice and Bob’s policy. A chain of comments can be created
through this approach. This feature allows to control access to a comment
even when it is posted on someone else’s object.
Policies may change over time. If an append policy changes, a mechanism
will verify the integrity of previously legitimate comments that satisfy the
old policy. After the policy change, the object owner signs the old comments
to ensure her readers that the old comments are valid. Changing the write
policy is straightforward and needs simple update in the reference. For a
read policy change that revokes access, no change in the object is necessary.




Objects are stored on untrusted DHT nodes, thus necessitating the use of
cryptography to protect their confidentiality and integrity. For confidential-
ity, Baden et al. [73] observed that ABE [49] is a good fit for OSNs because
it allows users to specify access policies in terms of groups of contacts, such
as friends, family, coworkers, etc. We adopt several modifications to the base
ABE to better satisfy our security requirements.
Confidentiality: We use an updated version of EASiER as the underlying
ABE scheme. Like most public-key schemes, ABE is usually used in hybrid
encryption mode, wherein the message is encrypted with a randomly chosen
symmetric encryption key, which is in turn encrypted with ABE. We follow
this approach with a modification that the ABEncrypted symmetric key is
in fact part of the object reference and not included in the object itself. The
main motivation for this choice is that the version of ABE we are using lacks
policy privacy and this approach keeps the policy hidden from untrusted
storage nodes. The reference is a part of the parent object and is encrypted
with its symmetric key. As a result, the reference cannot reveal the policy.
An additional consequence of this approach is that when several references
for an object exist, the object may have different read policies associated with
it. For example, if Bob posts a comment on a status update on Alice’s wall,
he may wish to add a reference to his comment (or even the status update)
to his own wall so that it can be seen by his contacts.1 In this case, Bob’s
comment may be visible to some subset of Alice’s contacts when reached
through her status update, and some subset of Bob’s contacts when reached
1Note that this may contravene Alice’s privacy wishes, but no architectural protection
short of DRM can prevent Bob from such re-sharing. A possible mitigation strategy is to




Integrity: To protect the integrity of the object, we make use of dig-
ital signatures. The owner of the object digitally signs its contents and
metadata, excluding the list of comments; each comment reference is signed
individually using a different signature key. The write and append policies
are implemented by controlling access to the corresponding secret signature
keys, which act as capabilities, similar in spirit to Tahoe-LAFS [74]. The
append-policy secret key is encrypted with an ABE policy; the write-policy
key can be encrypted with conventional encryption since it typically needs
to be accessible by a single person (the object owner). Both public keys are
stored as part of the object metadata, but the write-policy public key must
be replicated as part of the object reference to ensure its authenticity; the
append-policy public key is authenticated by the write-policy signature. An
object reference, therefore, consists of:
objRef
def
= (objID ,ABE(K,P ),WPK )
where objID is a random object identifier, used to locate it in the DHT, K is
the symmetric key used to encrypt the referenced object, P is the attribute-
based read policy, and WPK is the write-policy signature public key. As an
optimization, ABE(K,P ), the ABEncrypted symmetric key, can be replaced
by an unencrypted K if the read policy of the referenced object matches the
container.
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4.2.3 Distributed Hash Table
Participants in the OSN are organized into a distributed hash table (DHT),
such as Pastry [71] or Kademlia [72]. The DHT creates a scalable key-value
store with an efficient lookup mechanism to locate nodes that store a given
object. DHT lookups can be made secure against attacks [30], ensuring that a
lookup will find the correct copy of an object if it exists. (It may additionally
find incorrect copies provided by malicious nodes; cryptographic integrity
protection described above can be used to identify the correct one.)
Objects in DECENT are stored in the DHT using the objID as the key.
Each object ID is randomly chosen,2 thus the user who runs the node stor-
ing an object has no relationship with the object owner and is therefore
untrusted, but the object confidentiality and integrity is protected by cryp-
tographic mechanisms outlined above. To ensure availability despite node
churn and malicious attacks, several replicas of an object are maintained.
DHTs typically use the neighbor set of the node responsible for the object
key to maintain replicas; the number of replicas needs to be tuned based on
the churn patterns of the network (malicious nodes can also be modeled as
churn in this case), which we will study in our future evaluation. To guaran-
tee freshness, each object has a version number as part of its metadata. The
version number is authenticated by the write-policy signature, thus a user
can query all of the replicas and use the freshest object returned.
Malicious users may try to modify or delete an existing object. Note
that the write policy prevents them from creating modifications that will be
accepted by the readers, as they cannot produce a correct signature, but they
may overwrite and destroy legitimate data. To address this, the write-policy
2DHTs typically use 128- or 160-bit keys; this ensures that collisions between two
randomly chosen keys are essentially impossible.
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public key is stored unencrypted as part of the object metadata. The storage
node will refuse to overwrite the stored object unless the new data is properly
signed by the write-policy key; deletions must likewise be authenticated with
a signature. Thus, as long as there is always at least one honest (but curious)
replica for an object, it will persist despite any malicious attacks. The write-
policy public key should not be a user’s permanent public key, as otherwise a
storage node could use it to link an object to its owner. Instead, a separate
WPK is generated for each object, ensuring unlinkability of objects. A copy
of the corresponding secret key (WSK ) is stored in the object, encrypted
with the owner’s secret key. We use the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)
for write-policy signatures because it allows new keys to be generated very
quickly.
In addition to the standard get (read) and put (write) requests, the DE-
CENT DHT supports an append request, which is used to add a comment
reference to an existing object. As with write requests, the storage node
verifies that the append carries the correct signature from the append-policy
key, using the public key (APK) that is stored in the clear as part of the
object.
4.2.4 Example
Join: To join DECENT, Alice sets up her profile, wall, and keys. She gen-
erates her ABE public and master secret keys and signature key pair. Alice
creates an object with her profile information, encrypts it with a symmetric
key, and signs it with her write-policy signature key SPKAlice. She generates
a random ID, saves her profile in the DHT using this ID, ABEncrypts the




































= Encrypted with K2
Figure 4.1: Example objects in DECENT. Alice’s wall is represented as an
object. Alice creates a status, stores it in the DHT and posts a reference to
the status on her wall. To comment on this status, Bob creates a comment
object, stores it in the DHT, and posts a signed reference to this comment
on Alice’s status object.
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object. Similarly, she sets up her wall. Alice can be reached through the
reference to a root object, which contains the references to her profile and
wall. The root object acts as another regular object and is stored in the
DHT. The root object can be thought of a user’s landing page on Facebook.
Establish Contacts: To establish the relationship friend, co-worker with
Bob, Alice generates an ABE secret key for Bob with the attributes friend,
co-worker. Relationships are asymmetric, so Bob may establish just acquain-
tance relationship with Alice by issuing an ABE secret key for this attribute.
Keys are exchanged out of band. Alice and Bob also exchange their root
object references.
Post and Comment: Figure 4.1 shows an example object structure.
When Alice wants to post a status update to her wall, she creates the status
update object, complete with version number, contents, and public and secret
keys for the write and append policies (WPK 1,WSK 1,APK 1,ASK 1). She
then generates a signature over the write-policy signature key (WSK 1). She
then picks a random symmetric encryption key K1 and encrypts the object
(except for WPK 1 and APK 1 and the signature); she also chooses a random
id ID1 and uses this to insert the object into the DHT. Finally, she creates a
reference to the status update, including ID1, K1 and her write-policy public
key (WPK 1) and adds it to her wall. K1 is encrypted with an attribute-based
policy P1, which governs who can read the status update. Note that Alice’s
wall will also be encrypted with a symmetric key K0 , which is part of the
reference to Alice’s profile that she gives to her friends.
When Bob wants to read Alice’s update, he finds the reference on Alice’s
wall and decrypts K1 with his attribute-based secret key that he got from
Alice, assuming that his attributes satisfy the policy P1. Note that Bob has
to satisfy the R-Policy associated with the wall object itself to get access to
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the reference. He then retrieves the object from the DHT with the key ID1
and decrypts the encrypted fields using K1. Finally, he verifies the signature
to ensure the authenticity of the object.
If Bob further wants to comment, then he first creates a comment object
following a process similar to Alice’s creation of her update. He then uses the
append operation to insert a reference to the new object into Alice’s update.
Assuming he satisfies the A-policy AP1, Bob decrypts ASK1 and uses it
to generate a signature on the reference. The encryption key K2 is further
ABEncrypted using Bob’s policy P2; thus, only users who satisfy both P1
and P2 will be able to read the comment.
4.3 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented a preliminary prototype of DECENT, which provides
functionality similar to the Facebook wall. It also provides a basic newsfeed
option, summarizing status updates from a person’s contact/friend list. We
use four different types of cryptographic schemes in DECENT: EASiER for
ABE, AES for symmetric encryption, DSA for signatures, and RSA to en-
crypt the write policy signature key. We use a combination of EASiER and
DSA to realize ABS. The key sizes are chosen as recommended by NIST [75]
for maximum security (refer to table 4.1). We use FreePastry with Euclidean
network topology for simulation, and Kademlia [47, 76] for the experiments
on PlanetLab as the underlying DHT. Our proxy was run on a standard
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Figure 4.2: Simulation Results for 10,000 nodes: The average time to view
another user’s wall with 10 and 20 status/post/comments is about 60 s and
120 s respectively. The average time to view a newsfeed with 20 peers is
109 s.
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Table 4.1: Key Size for Cryptographic Schemes used in DECENT
Cryptographic Scheme Type Key Size (bits)
Attribute-based Encryption EASiER MNT with 159
Symmetric Key Encryption AES 128
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(b) View Others’ Wall
Figure 4.3: PlanetLab Results: The average time to view another user’s
wall with 10 status/post/comments is about 168 s.
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4.3.1 Simulation
We perform experiments to measure the performance of viewing a newsfeed
and wall with varying numbers of status messages, posts, and comments.
The simulation was run on a peer-to-peer network of 10 000 nodes. Figure 4.2
shows our simulation results.
View Wall: To view a wall, a user uses the wall reference to fetch the
wall object, ABDecrypts the wall reference to get the AES key to decrypt
the wall object, and gets the wall metadata and the references to statuses
and posts. Each reference is used to fetch the corresponding status or post.
The user ABDecrypts the reference to view the content of the object.
We perform tests to view wall with: 1) only statuses, 2) statuses and same
number of posts from friends, and 3) statuses, posts, and one comment on
each status from friends. Figures 4.2a and 4.2b show results for viewing
one’s own wall and friends’ walls respectively. A data point such as x sta-
tuses means that when a user views a wall that contains statuses, posts, and
comments, she views x of each, i.e., 3x objects.
We allow users to cache the AES encryption keys for the objects they
create and thus avoid ABDecryption of the references to their own objects.
Therefore, viewing one’s own wall with only statuses is much faster than
viewing a friend’s wall with only statuses. Viewing one’s own wall with
statuses and posts involves ABDecryption for the posts from friends and
only AESDecryption for the statuses. The same applies to comments from
friends. When a user has not posted anything herself to her friends’ walls,
then viewing friends’ walls involves ABDecryption for each item on the wall,
and so represents the worst case scenario.
The current view time (e.g., 90 s to view a user’s own wall with 20 statuses,
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20 posts, and 20 comments) may appear large; however, content can be
displayed progressively, and thus older messages can be fetched while the
user is reading the most recent messages, which are loaded within the first
few seconds. We are also currently working on cryptographic optimizations
to speed up these operations.
View Newsfeed: We test our prototype to evaluate the basic newsfeed
functionality. This approach fetches the latest status from each of a user’s
friends. Figure 4.2c shows the results. An example newsfeed with 40 feeds
takes around 215 s to construct and view. The results will be improved
with parallel lookups and decryption. However, in current OSNs a user’s
newsfeed generally shows 20–30 posts at a time. Some techniques, such as
showing feeds in blocks and pre-fetching the latest updates from friends while
the user is oﬄine, will improve the performance. We will investigate these
techniques in our future evaluation.
Post and Comment: To post/comment on another user’s wall, a user
signs the reference to the post or comment with the append-policy signature
key of the parent object, which she ABDecrypts from the parent object. The
average time to post or comment is 3.94 s. The results are reasonable since
a user can continue her OSN activities while the update is performed.
4.3.2 Experiments on PlanetLab
We perform the same experiments on 15 PlanetLab nodes to get an idea of
DECENT’s performance in a real deployment. Currently, the DHT has been
implemented on PlanetLab using a Kademlia prototype extracted from the
Likir implementation [47]. Figure 4.3 shows the results of our preliminary
PlanetLab experiments. As expected, the time to view walls in PlanetLab
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machines takes slightly longer because of network delays, such as the commu-
nication between peers and the proxy. In addition, because of node failures,
a few of the users’ walls could not be viewed, and in some experiments,
walls were retrieved only partially. We also test the time to construct and
view the newsfeed. A newsfeed with 11 feeds takes 37.3 s (95% confidence
interval is [34.4, 40.1] s), which closely resembles our simulation results. For
improved performance and resilience, we are investigating the use of caching
and replication parameters, which will be reported in subsequent work.
4.4 Leveraging Social Links to Improve Performance
The cost to view walls and newsfeeds in DECENT suffers from performance
issues that arise due to the fetching and decryption of hundreds of small ob-
jects belonging to friends. We therefore propose an extension to DECENT.
It adds an unstructured overlay to the base architecture in which a conven-
tional distributed hash table is augmented with social links between users.
New updates are immediately propagated to online social contacts. When
an oﬄine user comes back online a presence protocol is used to locate online
contacts and query them directly for updates. Additionally, these contacts
are used to retrieve cached updates from mutual contacts who are online as
well as speed the discovery of other online contacts. The DHT is then used to
retrieve updates that may not be cached, ensuring high availability of data.
To reduce computational overhead cached containers are stored in de-
crypted form and are shared with other contacts upon verifying that they
satisfy the corresponding access policy; as such, containers must be decrypted
only when fetched directly from the DHT. Storage nodes are trusted only to
provide availability of the data with replication used to defend against node
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failures or intentional misbehavior.
We develop a prototype implementation of the extended version in the
FreePastry simulator. To demonstrate the functionality of existing OSNs,
we also build and evaluate the newsfeed application. Our results show the
importance of using social caching, which reduces the latency of displaying
a newsfeed from hundreds of seconds in the base architecture to less than
10. Our architecture thus demonstrates how a careful combination of several
distributed systems and cryptographic techniques can be used to provide a
compelling privacy-preserving alternative to centralized OSNs. For further
details, please refer to [37].
4.5 Conclusion
In this work we proposed DECENT, a design for decentralized social networks
with an emphasis on security and privacy. DECENT uses an efficient cryp-
tographic mechanism for confidentiality, combining traditional and advanced
cryptographic schemes for integrity, and the use of a DHT for availability.
We discussed the architecture in detail, and presented a prototype of our
design. Simulation and experiments on PlanetLab with our prototype show
that a privacy-enhanced OSN based on DHT with focus on confidentiality
and integrity is a feasible architecture. Our extension to DECENT shows
that a hybrid architecture that combines structured storage with unstruc-




Decentralization enhances security and privacy of user data by removing con-
trol over data from the social networking provider (for example, Facebook,
Google+) to the users, but it introduces new challenges in security and pri-
vacy. Encrypted data stored in untrusted nodes prevents unauthorized ac-
cess. Storage nodes cannot relate encrypted data to its owner because of
randomized write authorization key as mentioned earlier in section 4. How-
ever, certain information, such as access patterns, are still available to the
storage provider and it can tell, for example, who you interact with socially.
At the same time, cryptographic access control makes it difficult to implement
important functionality and security protections, such as allowing access to
friends of friends and revoking access or maintaining an audit log of accesses.
Therefore, encrypting the data can solve part of the problem, as the data
owner can control access by distributing cryptographic keys to appropriate
users.
In our work, we allow a data owner to receive a log of data accesses, while
at the same time hiding this information from the storage provider 1. The use
of anonymization tools, such as Tor [77], for reaching the storage service can
help with the latter. To address the auditability, we make use of anonymous
credentials with revocable anonymity [38]. These credentials allow users to
prove that they are authorized to access a service or a piece of data without
1Note that, though we have discussed formation of a distributed hash table by the
social networking users for data storage, users may also have an option to store their data
on cloud storage services.
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revealing the contents of the credential and, importantly, their identity. Each
access, however, generates an encrypted record that can be used by a special
anonymity revocation service to learn who was behind such an access. In our
architecture, this service is run by the data owner, who is able to decrypt
the audit log records and get an access log.
We extend the revocable anonymous credential scheme to support creden-
tial chains that allow a credential owner delegate some or all of its access
rights to someone else by creating a signed credential. We adapt a technique
in anonymous webs of trust (AWoT) [39] that is able to verify signatures
on credentials using zero-knowledge proofs. Credential chains can enable ac-
cess by friends of friends, or people even further away in the social graph.
Users issue certificates to their friends, who on the other hand can certify
their friends. A user who wishes to access data can prove that there exists
a chain of credentials that authorizes access for the user without revealing
any information about the credential chain itself. At the same time, the user
generates an encrypted record containing the information in the chain and
proves, once again in zero knowledge, that it is constructed correctly. This
record is then kept by the storage provider as a private access log for later
decryption and verification by the data owner.
We implement the proposed scheme and develop a prototype as a proof
of concept. We use Σ protocol [78] and zero knowledge proofs [79]. Experi-
ment with our prototype shows that creating proofs and verifying them are
expensive (specifically in terms of time required). However, replacing our
signature and zero knowledge proof schemes with other signature and zero




Commitment is a cryptographic scheme that allows a party to commit to a
value while having the capability to hide it and reveal it later. Commitment
consists of two phases – 1) commit and 2) reveal. Commitment is hiding,
that means the chosen value to commit is hidden during the commit phase,
and binding, meaning the committed value cannot be changed. Pedersen
commitment [80] is information theoretically hiding and binding in discrete
log assumption.
To commit to a value x ∈ Zp, a party chooses a group G with large prime
order p and random generator g. She chooses another random generator h
of G where loghg is unknown and computing discrete logarithms is infeasible,
randomly chooses r ∈ Zp, and calculates the commitment C = gxhr mod p.
In the reveal phase, she sends x and r to V who recomputes the commitment
and compares it to C. Here, p, is a safe prime, i.e., p = 2q + 1 where q is
also a prime.
5.1.2 Zero Knowledge Proof
Zero knowledge proof (ZKP) of knowledge [79] is a cryptographic scheme that
allows a prover P to prove a statement S to a verifier V without revealing
S to V. Besides, S cannot be forged. ZKPs must have three properties – 1)
completeness, i.e., if S is true, an honest verifier will be convinced of this fact,
2) soundness, i.e., if S is false, then no adversary can convince it to an honest
verifier, and 3) zero-knowledge, i.e., if S is true, an adversary learns nothing
else other than this fact. Generally, ZKP is a three step process where in the
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second step V sends a challenge to P, which P responds to. Another form
of ZKP known as Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof (NIZK) [81] allows
the prover to send a single statement that the verifier can use to convince
himself of S.
Generally, the statement to prove is of the form y = gx, i.e., proving the
knowledge of integer x to the base g, where G is a group of large prime
order p , and g is a generator of G. The prover P chooses random r ∈R Zp,
calculates t = gr, and sends it to the verifier V. V picks a random challenge
c ∈R {0, 1}k and sends it to P. P then calculates s = r − cx and sends it to
V. V is convinced if t = ycgs holds. In NIZK, the challenge is calculated by
the prover as the hash of the commitments (y and t) and sent to V. V can
verify whether the challenge is correct by recomputing the hash. Adopting
the notation in [82], this protocol is denoted by PK{(α) : y = gα}, where
PK is an abbreviation of proof of knowledge. Greek letters represent values
that are hidden.
5.1.3 Anonymous Credentials
Protecting user privacy while allowing them access to information is chal-
lenging. Anonymous credential systems or pseudonyms [83] allow users to
prove their credentials without revealing anything about their identity. In
anonymous credential systems, a user gets a certificate with a set of creden-
tials or attributes from an organization, which she can later prove to the
same or a different organization anonymously.
The desirable properties of anonymous credentials are: anonymous cre-
dentials should be unlinkable, i.e., users can use the same certificate without
being linked between each use; collusion resistant, i.e., credentials from differ-
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ent users cannot be combined together; private, i.e., nothing else other than
the user owning a set of credentials is revealed; prevent against misuse, i.e.,
credentials cannot be used for any other reason than what they have been
assigned for. Also, delegatable credentials are appropriate for most cases
since it allows a certificate on a set of attributes from a party u to v to be
delegated to another party w. w can then anonymously prove to u that she
has a certificate that starts from u and ends at herself.
5.1.4 Anonymous Webs of Trust
Certificates bind a public key to its owner. When a party u signs the public
key of another party v, he certifies that he trusts u. Web of trust allows to put
trust in a public key through a chain of certificates. Each user has a public
key pk and a secret key sk. A certificate chain sig(pk3, sk2), sig(pk2, sk1)
means that the owner of pk1 has certified pk2, which certifies pk3. If a party
gets a message m signed by a public key pk and cannot find a direct certificate
for pk, i.e., he did not sign that key, he looks up for a chain of certificates
that starts with him and ends with pk.
Anonymous web of trust [39] allows to prove a chain of certificates anony-
mously using zero knowledge proof. The only information that is revealed is
the length of the certificate chain. In its simplest form, the certificate con-
tains a signature on a public key. While extended, the certificate can show




Certification binds a public key to its owner, and proves a user’s trust in the
owner of that key. Certificates can consist of a signature on a message, a
public key, or a combination of public key and attributes. It can formally be
defined as Ci = sign(M, ski) where M is a message (m), public key (pki+1) ,
or public key and attribute (pki+1, attr). A certificate chain C1...Cn defines a
trust relationship of length n−1 starting from the key pk1 and ending at pkn,
i.e., owner of pk1 signs pk2; owner of pk2 signs pk3 and so on. Verification of
this chain consists of verifying each of the certificate Ci(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
In a social networking context, generally, a certificate will consist of a sig-
nature on a relationship defined through a set of attributes or credentials and
a public key. For example, a user A issues a certificate that proves that user
B is the owner of the public key PKB and has the relationship friend with
user A(Figure 5.1). Similarly user B can do so for C. Note that certificates
are unidirectional. So, B has to certify A to establish a relationship. This
feature allows asymmetric relationship in OSN. For example, A may certify B
as boss whereas B certifies A as colleague. This concept is similar as in [39].
The functionalities for certification will consist of assigning credentials –
generate and issue certificate and distribute it through some channel; and
prove credentials – prove that a certificate is on a set of credentials either
directly or through a chain of certificates. Note that, a certificate gives access
to encrypted data and allows auditing. A needs a decryption key in addition
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Figure 5.1: Certification, Access Control, and Private Audit in
Decentralized Social Network
5.2.2 Storage Service
In a decentralized OSN, user data is distributed, and generally stored with
other users in the OSN or with third party storage providers such as cloud
service. In both approaches, data is encrypted to prevent unauthorized access
and tampering. In addition to storing user data, the storage provider also
has other responsibilities. For example,
• Availability – It ensures through replication that data is available any-
time whether a user herself is online or oﬄine.
• Access Control – Any request on data such as access, update, delete,
or append operation is authenticated through certificates. The data
owner attaches a policy to encrypted data that describes what trust
level is required to read or write a piece of data. The storage provider
uses this policy to verify the requested action on the data. However, a
second level of security ensures that even if the storage provider does
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not abide by the policy, the encrypted data is not visible to or updated
by someone who does not have the appropriate key.
• Logging – It keeps record of each access in an encrypted access log.
With anonymous audit, the storage provider does not see the record
itself.
5.2.3 Anonymous Access and Auditing
Access to data is requested through a chain of certificates anonymously. The
requester proves in zero knowledge that she is at a certain level of relationship
d and possesses a certain set of attributes without revealing her identity.
For example, she can prove that she has got the attribute friend from the
data owner’s friend. The storage provider verifies the proof, and after being
convinced, gives the data in encrypted form to the requester.
The requester also supplies a statement that identifies her, encrypted to
the owner of the access log. This information, too is proved through zero
knowledge, and so, the data owner is convinced later that the access log in
correct. In our current architecture, the storage provider knows what data
is being accessed. However, while combined with more advanced techniques
such as private information retrieval [84] , it is possible to hide this informa-
tion too.
5.2.4 Combination with DECENT
While establishing relationship with a social contact by distributing secret
attribute keys, users also sign the public key of the contact and grant them
certificates. These certificates can be distributed through a private channel.
The storage provider runs a separate service that checks the certificates in
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zero knowledge and if convinced, gives the requester data that is stored en-
crypted with EASiER. This service also generates an access log from the zero
knowledge proof that is encrypted to the data owner. The data owner can
periodically get the access log and decrypt it to see who accessed her data.
In an extended version of DECENT where users cache social networking
data, this approach is more useful for viewing which friends of friends or
people further in relationship graph rather than direct friends accessed a
piece of data as the friend information is already attached to the data itself.
5.3 Cryptographic Construction
5.3.1 Signature Scheme
We use the signature scheme by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [85] (CL-signature)
as in AWoT. CL-signature scheme consists of a public key PK = (a, b, c, n)
and private key SK = p, where n = pq is a special RSA modulus (p and q
are safe primes, i.e., p = 2p′ + 1 and q = 2q′ + 1 where p′ and q′ are also
primes), a, b, c are randomly chosen from Z∗n and a, b, c are quadratic resedue
modulo n, i.e., for each of these elements (say y), ∃x ∈ Z∗n such that x2 = y
mod n .
A signature on a message m of length lm is as follows: choose a random
prime number e > 2lm+1 of length le = lm + 2 and a random s of length
ls = ln + lm + l, where l is a security parameter. A value v = (a
mbsc)1/e mod
n is calculated. The signature consists of the tuple (e, s, v). The verification




We use ElGamal encryption scheme [86] to create the private access log. In
ElGamal scheme, a user Alice selects a group G of order p, a group generator
g, and a random number x ∈R G. Her public key is (G, g, p, gx) and secret
key is x. To encrypt a message m to Alice, Bob chooses a random y ∈R G,
calculates gy, computes a shared secret gxy, converts m to a group member
m′ ∈ G, and encrypts it as c = m′gxy. Bob sends (c, gy) to Alice. Alice
computes the shared secret gxy and retrieves m′. In our scheme, a message is
a user’s identity and credential, which she encrypts for the access log owner.
5.3.3 Protocol
To access data anonymously, a prover constructs a proof statement that
consists of a signature on M . As mentioned earlier, M can be one of three
forms.
Signature on a Message
The signature public key is (α = a, β = b, γ = c, η = n), the signature is
(µ, ν, σ), and the intermediate values are τ1 = a
m mod n, τ2 = b
s mod n, τ3 =
ve mod n, τ4 = a
mbs mod n. The verification consists of checking if ve =
ambsc mod n, and that m and e are in proper ranges.
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PK{α, αr, β, βr, γ, γr, η, ηr, µ, µr, ν, νr, σ, σr, , r, (τi, τir)4i=1 :
Ca = g
αhαr ∧ Cb = gβhβr ∧ Cc = gγhγr ∧ Cn = gηhηr ∧ Cm = gµhµr∧
Cv = g
νhνr ∧ Cs = gσhσr ∧ Ce = ghr∧
Cam = g
τ1hτ1r ∧ Cbs = gτ2hτ2r ∧ Cve = gτ3hτ3r ∧ Cambs = gτ4hτ4r∧
τ1 = α
µ ∧ τ2 = βσ ∧ τ3 = ν ∧ τ4 = τ1 · τ2 ∧ τ3 = τ4 · γ∧
0 ≤ µ < 2lm ∧ 2lm+1 <  < 2lm+2}
Signature on a Public Key
The second type is verification of signature on a public key (α2 = a2, β2 =
b2, γ2 = c2, η2 = n2). The signer’s public key is (α1 = a1, β1 = b1, γ1 =
c1, η1 = n1). (a2, b2, c2) are tied together as m = a2 + 2
la2 (b2 + 2
lb2 (c2 +
2lc2n2)) mod n2 where la2 , lb2 , lc2 are lengths of a2, b2, and c2 respectively.
The sign on m is ve = am1 b
s
1 mod n1 and the intermediate values are calculated
as τ1 = a
m
1 mod n1, τ2 = b
s
1 mod n1, τ3 = v




1 mod n1, θ1 =
(c2 + 2
lc2n2) mod n2, θ2 = (b2 + 2
lb2 (c2 + 2
lc2n2)) mod n2. The construction
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is as follows:
PK{(αi, βi, γi, ηi, θi, αir, βir, γir, ηir, θir)2i=1,






αihαir ∧ Cbi = gβihβir ∧ Cci = gγihγir ∧ Cni = gηihηir)2i=1∧
Cm = g
µhµr ∧ Cc2n2 = gθ1hθ1r ∧ Cb2c2n2 = gθ2hθ2r
Cv = g
νhνr ∧ Cs = gσhσr ∧ Ce = ghr∧
Cam1 = g
τ1hτ1r ∧ Cbs1 = gτ2hτ2r ∧ Cve = gτ3hτ3r ∧ Cam1 bs1 = gτ4hτ4r∧
(Cn2)
2lc2 = gφ1hφ1r ∧ (Cc2n2)2




1 ∧ τ2 = βσ1 ∧ τ3 = ν ∧ τ4 = τ1 · τ2 ∧ τ3 = τ4 · γ1∧
θ1 = γ2 + 2
lc2η2 ∧ θ2 = β2 + 2lb2θ1 ∧ µ = α2 + 2la2θ2∧
2lm+1 <  < 2lm+2}
Signature on a Public Key and Attribute
The third type is verification of signature on a public key(α2 = a2, β2 =
b2, γ2 = c2, η2 = n2) and attribute ξ = A. The signer’s public key is (α1 =




lc2n2))) where la2 , lb2 , lc2 , lA are lengths of a2, b2, c2,
and A respectively. The sign on m is ve = am1 b
s
1 mod n1 and the intermediate
values are calculated as τ1 = a
m
1 mod n1, τ2 = b
s
1 mod n1, τ3 = v
e mod n1, τ4 =
am1 b
s
1 mod n1, θ1 = (c2 + 2
lc2n2) mod n2, θ2 = (b2 + 2
lb2 (c2 + 2
lc2n2)) mod n2,
and θ3 = a2 + 2
la2 (b2 + 2
lb2 (c2 + 2
lc2n2))) mod n2. The construction is as
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follows:
PK{(αi, βi, γi, ηi, αir, βir, γir, ηir)2i=1, (θi, θir)3i=1,






αihαir ∧ Cbi = gβihβir ∧ Cci = gγihγir ∧ Cni = gηihηir)2i=1 ∧ CA = gξhξr∧
Cm = g
µhµr ∧ Cc2n2 = gθ1hθ1r ∧ Cb2c2n2 = gθ2hθ2r ∧ Ca2b2c2n2 = gθ3hθ3r
Cv = g
νhνr ∧ Cs = gσhσr ∧ Ce = ghr∧
Cam1 = g
τ1hτ1r ∧ Cbs1 = gτ2hτ2r ∧ Cve = gτ3hτ3r ∧ Cam1 bs1 = gτ4hτ4r∧
(Cn2)
2lc2 = gφ1hφ1r ∧ (Cc2n2)2
lb2 = gφ2hφ2r∧
(Cb2c2n2)




1 ∧ τ2 = βσ1 ∧ τ3 = ν ∧ τ4 = τ1 · τ2 ∧ τ3 = τ4 · γ1∧
θ1 = γ2 + 2
lc2η2 ∧ θ2 = β2 + 2lb2θ1 ∧ θ3 = α2 + 2la2θ2 ∧ µ = ξ + 2lAθ3∧
2lm+1 <  < 2lm+2}
Log Entry
The construction for logging and audit is as follows: x is the access log
owner’s ElGamal secret key, χ1 = g1 is the ElGamal group generator, χ2 = y
is the accessor’s random secret, χ3 = g
y
1 is the accessor’s random public,
χ4 = g
x
1 is the access log owner’s public key, χ5 = g
xy
1 is the shared secret,
and χ6 = mg
xy
1 is the encryption of m. χ3 and χ6 are logged by the storage
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provider and opened later by the access log owner.
PK{(χi, χir)6i=1, µ, µr :
Cm = g
µhµr ∧ Cg1 = gχ1hχ1r ∧ Cy = gχ2hχ2r∧
Cgy1 = g
χ3hχ3r ∧ Cgx1 = gχ4hχ4r ∧ Cgxy1 = gχ5hχ5r ∧ Cm·gxy1 = gχ6hχ6r∧
χ3 = χ
χ2
1 ∧ χ5 = χχ24 ∧ χ6 = µ · χ5}
5.4 Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented the proposed scheme in Java. We measured the time re-
quired to create and verify a proof statement of each form. We used the
suggested key length in [85], which is 1024 bits for each of the four public
key components a, b, c, n, and 160 bit for the message m (hence, 162 bits
for e and 1344 bits for s) in the signature. However, when a public key or a
public key with attribute is used as a message, the message size changes, and
we set it to a group member by modular operation. Since we need to prove
that some variables lie within a range, our group G is of order p = 2259. |p|
has to be at least 2(2l+5) where  > 1 is a security parameter. We set  = 1.1.
We chose the length of the attribute to be 1024 bits. The group for ElGamal
encryption also is of size 2259 bits.
A proof construction of signature on a message requires 3 proofs for expo-
nentiation, and 2 proofs for multiplication. A sign on public key requires 3
proofs for exponentiation, 2 proofs for multiplication, and 3 proofs for addi-
tion. A sign on a combination of public key and attribute requires 3 proofs
for exponentiation, and 2 proofs for multiplication, and 4 proofs for addi-
tion. Finally, a log entry needs 2 proof for exponentiation, and 1 proofs for
multiplication. However, we can reuse some commitments as they appear in
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various proofs.
Sigma protocols are expensive. We had to use large group order for higher
security. Also, CL signature scheme requires use of long keys. Therefore,
creation and verification of proof statements are in order of hours. We realize
that the time required to create and verify the proof statements is high.
However, we believe that implementing the system based on other schemes
such as automorphic signature [87] and Groth-Sahai zero knowledge proof [88]
will improve these results.
5.5 Related Work
A feature that allows users to keep track of who viewed their social networking
profile has been enabled in the OSNs LinkedIn and Orkut. Researchers have
also proposed a negotiated audit in [41]. In sh@re, a user is able to view
who accessed his data if he also allows logging while accessing others data.
Different typed of logging are allowed. We, for the first time, allow this
feature in a decentralized social network that uses cryptography to protect
user data.
Research has showed that users’ access behavior can change if she knows
her access is being recorded [89, 90]. For example, a user may allow her co-
workers to see where she checked in, but may feel different and be encouraged
to change her policy if she finds out that her boss is checking her profile
frequently.
Anonymous credential schemes allow users to prove a set of credentials to
a verifier in zero knowledge. Camenisch et al. propose an anonymous cre-
dential scheme that provides option for anonymity revocation [38]. However,
credential delegation is an issue in their approach. Scheme by Belenkiy et
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al. [91] supports delegation of credentials, but lacks anonymity revocation.
Backes et al. propose Anonymous Webs of Trust [39] that allows users to
prove a certificate chain in zero knowledge. The ZKP reveals the length of
the certificate chain and the recipient’s identity only. However, this approach
does not support anonymity revocation. Our approach combines the concept
of anonymous webs of trust and anonymous credentials, and augments the
level of security and privacy provided by these approaches by adding an
additional level of private access log.
5.6 Conclusion
Auditable anonymity allows people at a certain distance in user’s social graph
to access their data anonymously while revealing their identity to the data
owner through a cryptographically constructed access log. While we pre-
sented this approach in the context of social networking, it is generalized
and applicable in any outsourced storage that stores sensitive data and needs
this extra level of privacy. We implemented this approach. However, further
investigation on the cryptographic schemes such as signature and zero knowl-
edge proof is required for performance improvement.
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6 A SECURE AND PRIVATE ONLINE
SOCIAL NETWORK
We have proposed three approaches that while combined together presents a
security and privacy enhanced online social network.
• First, EASiER, the encryption-based access control with efficient revo-
cation scheme provides confidentiality to the data stored by the social
networking users. It allows users to explicitly control access to their
data by encrypting it while providing an option to revoke access effi-
ciently.
• Second, DECENT, presents a comprehensive design about how to com-
bine various cryptographic schemes including EASiER for confidential-
ity and integrity, distributed hash table for storage and availability, and
object oriented concept for data representation with flexible, expres-
sive, and better privacy policy. An extension to DECENT [37] allows
more efficient data retrieval by leveraging social trust and caching of
unencrypted data.
• Finally, auditable anonymity constructs an access log for the data
owner and reveals who accesses her data while hiding this informa-
tion from the storage provider. The storage provider is generalized and
can be a user in the social network or a cloud service. This service is
run by the storage provider. While combined with DECENT, it adds
an extra level of security and privacy. In the extended version of DE-
CENT, this approach helps users identify parties who are farther than
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Online social networking is the next de-facto way of communication. It is
even getting out of socialization only boundary and being used in other
domains such as anonymization communication [92], routing [93], detect-
ing sybil nodes [94], and healthcare domain. Therefore, both users and
researchers are emphasizing on information security and privacy in OSNs.
We believe that security and privacy in online social networking is still an
emerging topic, and researchers are still working on various approaches to
address this challenge. Different techniques come with their own benefits
and shortcomings.
In this thesis, we have mentioned three techniques to enhance security and
privacy properties of OSNs.
• First, we presented an encryption technique EASiER that supports ex-
pressiveness, fine-grained policy, and efficient revocation. This scheme
provides confidentiality to the data stored by the social networking
users. It allows users to explicitly control access to their data by en-
crypting it while providing an option to revoke access efficiently.
• Next, we presented a design and prototype of a decentralized architec-
ture and how to address various challenges of decentralization. DE-
CENT presents a comprehensive design about how to combine vari-
ous cryptographic schemes including EASiER for confidentiality and
integrity, distributed hash table for storage and availability, and ob-
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ject oriented concept for data representation with flexible, expressive,
and better privacy policy. An extension to DECENT [37] allows more
efficient data retrieval by leveraging social trust and caching of unen-
crypted data.
• Finally, we presented a cryptographic technique to allow access trace
in a secure environment while hiding this information from the storage
provider. Auditable anonymity constructs an access log for the data
owner and reveals who accesses her data while hiding this information
from the storage provider. The storage provider is generalized and can
be a user in the social network or a cloud service. This service is run
by the storage provider. While combined with DECENT, it adds an
extra level of privacy that gives the data owner an implication of her
privacy policy.
Our future direction of research includes application of a secure and private
social network in healthcare domain. We envision a social networking system
that users can use without putting absolute trust in a single and powerful
authority. We also see a future where a security and privacy enhanced social
networking will be used in providing better service to the general people.
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